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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation 
("Brown"), present the following issues for review by this Court on the cross-appeal. 
/. Did the district court err in awarding defendants I appellants ("Richards") attorney fees 
despite Richards1 failure to properly distinguish among compensable successful claims, 
noncompensable successful claims and unsuccessful claims'? 
Standard of Review. A party's entitlement to attorney fees is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252,1257 (Utah App. 
1996). The reasonableness of an award of attorney fees is subject to an abuse of discretion 
standard. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).1 This issue was 
preserved for review in all of the proceedings which occurred in the trial court after remand 
by this Court Specifically, see Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Entry of Amended Judgment. (R. 4967-5000) 
2. Did the trial court err in awarding Richards post-appeal fees for attempting to 
prove the claim for fees, which amounted to a fees for fees award? 
Standard of Review. The reasonableness of the award of attorney fees is subject to 
an abuse of discretion standard. Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991. However, some of the 
arguments here concern a party's entitlement to attorney fees which is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Selvage, 910 P.2d at 1257. This issue was preserved in Brown's 
jIn his opening brief Richards framed most of the issues concerning Judge Rigtrup's 
award of attorney fees as issues to be judged by a correctness standard. Yet, this Court 
specifically noted in Selvage, a trial court '"has broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse of 
discretion standard'" 910 P.2d at 1257, quoting Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Richards' Motion for Reconsideration and Brown's 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike Richards' Supplemental 
Memorandum on the Issue of Attorney Fees. (R. 5644-55; 5685-93) 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding Richards judgment interest on attorney fees 
to begin before the date that such fees were determined by the court? 
Standard of Review. The award of judgment interest presents a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App. 
1994) ("Bailey I"). This issue was preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition dated February 3, 1994. (R. 4967-5000) 
4. Did the trial court err in ruling that post-judgment interest carries an interest 
rate of the applicable interest rate statute in effect at the time of entry of the judgment, 
despite a subsequent amendment to the statute before entry of the post-appeal judgment? 
Standard of Review. Statutory interpretation by the trial court is reviewed for 
correctness. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 968 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). This issue 
was preserved in Brown's Memorandum in Opposition to Richards' Motion for 
Reconsideration. (R. 5644-55) 
5. Did the trial court err in awarding pre-judgment interest to run from a date 
prior to the determination of the amount of the breach of warranty award? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's determination of the date from which interest is 
to run is reviewed for correctness. Bjork v. April Industries. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 
1977). This issue was preserved for appeal in Brown's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, and Brown's 
Reply Memorandum. (R. 5171-82; 4967-5000; 5199-5205) 
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6. Did the trial court incorrectly refuse to offset Richards' judgment against 
Brown's judgment so that only one net judgment resulted from this action? 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness with no deference to the trial court. PDQ Lube Ctr.. Inc. v. Huber. 949 P.2d 
792, 797 (Utah App. 1997); Bailey-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180, 192 (Utah App. 
1997) ("Bailey II11). This issue was preserved in Brown's Response to Defendant's Latest 
Motion for Release. (R. 5542) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules which are determinative of the outcome 
of this case are set out in the text or the addenda of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose out of the sale of the business assets and building of Interwest 
Aviation, a fixed base operation at Salt Lake International Airport. The case was tried to a 
jury, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, for eight weeks in early 1989. The jury returned its 
verdict in the form of answers to interrogatories. (R. 2808-21) Judge Rigtrup entered an 
initial judgment on December 21, 1989. (R. 3090-116) Following several post-trial 
proceedings, Judge Rigtrup entered final judgment on October 18, 1990. (R. 4072-102) 
Richards appealed and Brown cross-appealed the trial court's final judgment. The 
appeal was decided by this Court on August 24, 1992 in Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 
(Utah App. 1992). While that appeal resolved many of the issues presented by the parties, 
the award of attorney fees to Richards was vacated and remanded to the trial court as was 
the issue of fees Brown may be entitled to on the rescission issue. Brown. 840 P.2d at 156. 
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After Brown filed unsuccessful petitions for rehearing and for a writ of certiorari, the case 
was remitted to the trial court on March 25, 1993. (R. 4316-17) 
Following extensive filings by both sides and discovery, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on attorney fees on January 31, February 1, 2, and 3, 1995. (R. 6049-52) 
Judge Rigtrup issued an oral ruling on April 1, 1996. (R. 5552-56; Addendum A) Richards 
then filed a "Motion for Further and Reconsideration" on April 26, 1996. (R. 5585-88) More 
filings ensued and the trial court held another hearing on June 17, 1996. (R. 6054) On 
December 31, 1996, the trial court issued a signed minute entry with its decision and 
reasoning. (R. 5706-16; Addendum B) On March 21, 1997, Judge Stephen Henriod, who 
took the case on Judge Rigtrup's retirement, entered findings and conclusions, which 
mirrored the December 31 minute entry, (R. 5876-83; Addendum C) and entered final 
judgment disposing of all remaining issues. (R. 5867-75; Addendum D) 
Dissatisfied with the amount of attorney fees awarded to him, Richards appealed. 
Brown cross-appealed the erroneous interpretations of Utah law by the trial court. 
FACTS 
The fact statement provided by Richards in his opening brief is neither complete nor 
entirely accurate. The following clarifies and supplements the facts set out by Richards. 
The parties entered into not two, but at least ten separate agreements involving the 
sale of Interwest Aviation. Those agreements are listed in a summary reprinted in the 
addenda. (Addendum E) The February 1, 1984 Purchase Agreement, was for the separate 
sale of a Gulf Stream Aero Commander. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 16) While no judgment resulted 
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from that agreement, there was much testimony regarding the airplane and Brown's 
reputation that went to Richards1 efforts to prove fraud (R. 6050, p. 232). This testimony 
had nothing to do with the Asset Sale Agreement under which Richards' successful breach 
of warranty claim entitled Richards to attorney fees. Brown, 840 P.2d at 156 n 12. Richards' 
counsel confirmed the essence of Richards' case by telling the jury that "This was a 
fundamentally fraudulent transaction." (R. 4226, p.5209) 
One of Richards' initial counterclaims was for rescission, but this claim was eventually 
dismissed. (R. 1108) This Court, in its prior opinion, noted that Brown should be awarded 
his fees for successfully defending this rescission claim. 840 P.2d at 156. 
This Court directed Richards on remand to "set out time and fees expended for (1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Brown. 840 
P.2d at 156 n.12. Richards' claim for attorney fees did not conform to these requirements. 
Richards' attorneys admitted using a 30% apportionment, initially made by the trial court 
before the first appeal, for work involving the real estate contract. (R. 6047 p.45) Richards' 
attorneys did not apportion any time for factual development of the real estate claims. 
(R.6050, p. 236) Richards' attorneys admitted "we have made no delineations between those 
portions of the work as to which we were unsuccessful." (R.6050, p. 240) Richards' 
attorneys never fully allocated time between contract issues and fraud issues and did not keep 
track of any of the work they did by specific claim. (R. 6049, p.87) Richards' attorneys 
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admitted that they made no reductions for their efforts to lift the judgment lien on Richards' 
property, (R.6050, p. 249-250) and that despite this Court's decision, they included fees for 
the failed rescission efforts. (R. 5225) They made no effort to reduce time spent obtaining 
reputation evidence and they made no effort to distinguish between the apparent shield of 
substantial performance and the sword of fraud. (R.6050, p. 249-50, 269-270) Therefore, the 
billing records kept by Richards' counsel were admittedly incapable of supporting allocations 
required. (R. 6050, p. 82) 
Consequently, Richards' counsel tried to reconstruct their efforts and justified the 
effort by alleging overlapping issues. Brief of Appellant at 28, 32. Despite Richards' counsels' 
testimony that they were skilled in complex litigation (R.6049, at 16), knew the controlling 
case law (R.6049, p. 80), knew at once that this case had a blend of compensable and non-
compensable issues (R.6049, p. 22-23) and represented insurance companies during this time 
period (R.6049, p. 73-74), the underlying records which they kept did not allocate time 
between specific compensable and non-compensable claims. This led the trial court to find 
the evidence submitted by Richards' attorneys was "admittedly not in conformity with the 
court of appeals' remand instructions . . .." (R. 5707) 
Brown presented the testimony of George Naegle who testified that insurance 
companies in the late 80's were prohibiting the very sort of "block billing" in which Richards' 
counsel engaged.2 (R. 6050, p.281-7) This block billing prevented the accurate allocation of 
time and effort as required on remand. 
2In block billing only one time entry is made for work done per day, with a description 
of all activity completed and no allocation of time per task. 
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Richards1 counsels' failure to accurately record their time and efforts by claim or even 
a reasonable description of their efforts, led to reliance in their fee application on arbitrary 
percentages. (R. 6050, p. 181-2; p. 177; R. 5126-9) The trial court discarded Browns 
suggested percentages (R. 4973, 4981) and relied upon its own percentage allocation after 
having presided over the trial. (R. 5706-16) 
On August 29, 1994, the court decided Richards would receive pretrial interest on his 
breach of warranty damages and prejudgment interest on his undetermined attorney fees. (R. 
5304) Following the early 1995 evidentiary hearing, the court awarded Richards a percentage 
of his claimed trial and appeal fees, no fees for fees, reversed the award of pre-judgment 
interest on fees, and awarding traditional costs. (R. 5552) Richards filed a "Motion for 
Further and Reconsideration." The court heard this motion on June 17, 1996, (R. 6054) and 
ruled by minute entry dated December 31, 1996. (R. 5706) It restored pre-judgment interest 
on Richards' fees (R. 5710) and, in another reversal, awarded Richards a percentage of his 
claimed fees for fees. (R. 5708-10) Judge Rigtrup, who retired on that date, directed that 
his successor, Judge Henriod, sign the approved findings and judgment. Both were signed 
and entered on March 21, 1997. (R. 5867; R. 5876) 
At the time the original final judgment was entered in October, 1990, the Utah 
Judgment Interest Statute, Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4, provided for 12% post-judgment interest 
on non-contract claims. During the first appeal to this Court, the Utah legislature amended 
that statute to tie the judgment interest percentage to that used by the federal court on a 
specific date each year. Judge Rigtrup's decision on judgment interest, interpreted the interest 
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statute to apply from the date the original judgment was entered and not subject to yearly 
charge. (R. 5304; R. 5873) Judge Rigtrup did not allow the judgments to be consolidated in 
one offsetting amount with one interest rate. (R. 5875) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On the cross-appeal, Brown maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when 
it awarded Richards any attorney fees because Richards1 fee evidence did not conform to this 
Court's remand requirement that Richards allocate his fees among compensable claims which 
were successful, compensable claims which were unsuccessful and noncompensable claims. 
Richards did not do this. 
The trial court erred when it awarded Richards attorney fees for calculating his 
attorney fees. The controlling case was misinterpreted by the trial court and is distinguishable 
from this case. Richards' initial failure to properly allocate fees started the chain of events 
resulting in the protracted proceedings here. Richards should not now be rewarded for his 
unsuccessful attempt to reconstruct flawed records. 
The trial court should not have awarded interest on Richards' attorney fees from the 
date of the original judgment. The amount of the fees was not known with mathematical 
certainty until determined by the trial court. Since the original award of fees was vacated, 
Richards' entitlement to a specific fee amount was not known until the trial court ruled. 
The trial court should have calculated interest on the various judgments by applying 
the amended statutory interest rate each year rather than maintaining the rate in effect at the 
time of the 1990 judgment. Courts which have permitted the original interest rate to remain 
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in effect for the life of the judgment have relied on specific statutory language which is 
absent in the Utah statute. Such absence indicates the legislature's intent that the annually 
revised judgment rate apply to all judgments, not just new ones. 
The trial court erred when it awarded pre-judgment interest on Richards' breach of 
warranty damages. These damages were not calculable with mathematical certainty until they 
were determined by the jury and, therefore, pre-judgment interest should not have been 
awarded. This interest was not awarded to Richards in 1990 and Richards did not appeal that 
decision in the first appeal. 
The trial court should have combined the various judgments into one net award in 
favor of Brown, with contract interest. This Court has said that one judgment should be 
rendered unless the claim and counterclaim are totally unrelated, not the case here. 
Finally, on the cross-appeal, Brown asserts that he should be awarded fees for this 
appeal as the prevailing party in the trial court and on appeal. 
With respect to the issues raised by Richards: Brown asserts if an award of any 
attorney fees to Richards is appropriate, the amount determined by the trial court should be 
affirmed. Richards has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in the award of 
fees. The arguments in Richards' brief on the attorney fees issues are not supported by 
citation to authority required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Richards' complaints 
regarding the award of attorney fees fail to acknowledge his own failure to comply with the 
remand requirements. The amount awarded by the trial court is appropriate in light of the 
nature of Richards' case, which primarily concerned fraud, a non fee compensable claim. 
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Richards is entitled only to costs as that term is traditionally used. When this Court 
vacated the award of attorney fees, the inseparable cost award was also vacated. 
Furthermore, the trial court corrected an earlier mistake in its award of costs to Richards. 
Brown contends that the trial court's award of attorney fees to him on the rescission 
claim, should be affirmed. The fees are not duplicative of prior fees. 
Finally, Richards deserves no attorney fees on appeal because of his failure to keep 
adequate records. Any award of fees on appeal would be a windfall to Richards. 
ARGUMENT 
On cross-appeal, Brown raises the following issues, some of which are determinative 
of Richards' appeal. 
POINT I 
RICHARDS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS FEE APPLICATION ON REMAND 
DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THIS COURT. 
Richards should not have been awarded any attorney fees because he did not meet the 
requirements imposed by this Court.3 The rule in Utah is that "attorney fees cannot be 
recovered by a prevailing party unless statute or contract authorizes such an award." Stewart 
v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). Conversely, attorney fees are 
not recoverable by a party who prevails on a fraud claim in connection with a contract. 
3
 This Court stated that Richards was "entided to attorney fees." 840 P.2d at 157. 
However, that conclusion was based on the court's holding that Richards prevailed on fee-
compensable issues. On the current appeal, Brown is asserting that Richards should not 
receive attorney fees because the evidence he submitted after remand lacked the allocations 
by this Court. 
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Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1264 (Utah App. 1996). Furthermore, a 
party seeking an award of attorney fees "must set out the time and fees expended for (1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have been an entidement to attorney fees had the claim been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entidement to attorney fees." Cottonwood 
Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992); Brown at 156. Finally, a party who 
requests an award of attorney fees "has the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to 
support the award." Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 268. In this case, fees were awarded 
pursuant to a contract provision.4 This Court stated that on remand Richards was required 
to establish time and fees expended in the three categories identified in Cottonwood Mall. 
Brown. 840 P.2d at 156 n 12. Richards not only failed to allocate his time and fees as 
required, but the record also demonstrates that Richards' attorneys would never be able to 
so allocate because the method used to bill Richards ignored the law on attorney fees. 
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between this issue and Point VIII below. 
In this point Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding any attorney 
fees to Richards while in Point VIII Brown asserts that, if any award was appropriate, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of attorney fees awarded to Richards. 
These positions are not inconsistent. In fact, the argument raised here is a threshold to the 
argument in Point VIII and, if accepted, precludes consideration of the fee issues raised by 
4
 The provision stated, "In the event suit is brought to enforce the provisions of this 
agreement, the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to recover its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection therewith." Brown. 840 P.2d at 154. 
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Richards. In Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112,1126 (Utah App. 1989), this 
Court stated, "an award [of attorney fees] made without adequate supporting evidence 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be overruled." See also Baldwin v. Burton. 850 
P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) (a trial court's award must be based upon supporting evidence 
in the record). Thus, the trial court was without the required supporting evidence and abused 
its discretion in awarding fees. On the other hand, if this Court holds that Richards did not 
have to allocate his fees as required, Brown maintains in Point VIII that the amount of fees 
the trial court awarded was not an abuse of discretion given the fractured evidence presented 
by Richards and the trial court's advantaged position to determine fees. 
In cases involving multiple issues and/or multiple parties, the type of evidence which 
must be presented to justify an award of attorney fees must be quite detailed. In 
Cottonwood Mall, the court reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees ,f[b]ecause the 
evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that the attorney fees were reasonable. . . ." 
830 P.2d at 269. There, attorney fees were being sought pursuant to a lease agreement which 
permitted an award of attorney fees for three kinds of legal work. Id. The supreme court 
stated that while Cottonwood Mall initiated the action to regain possession of the premises, 
for which attorney fees were permitted under the lease, the trial of the case addressed some 
issues which were unrelated to the lease. In its request for attorney fees, Cottonwood Mall 
"did not distinguish between work that was subject to a fee award and work that was not." 
Id. The supreme court emphasi2ed that a party seeking an award of attorney fees in a multi-
issue case must "set out the time and fees spent" for successful compensable claims, 
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unsuccessful compensable claims and non-compensable claims. 830 P.2d 269-70, quoting 
Graco Fishing & Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 
(Utah 1988). Cottonwood Mall had not sufficiently distinguished among the three categories 
to support an award of attorney fees. See also Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n.. 
657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982) (A significant reduction in requested fees upheld because 
the trial court had "sufficient information before it in the billing records to enable it to 
separate the [unrecoverable] counterclaim hours from those spent on the defense of the main 
causes of action.") Finally, as noted, it is an abuse of discretion to base an award of attorney 
fees on inadequate evidence. Redevelopment Agency. 785 P.2d at 1126. 
In Brown, this Court appeals specifically vacated the trial courtfs prior award of 
attorney fees to Richards because the trial court's previous findings did not "indicate what 
work was actually performed in relation to the contractual claims upon which Richards 
prevailed and that it was necessary . . ." 840 P.2d at 156. This Court also noted that this was 
a complex matter involving the adjudication of multiple claims arising under several contracts 
with each party winning on some issues and losing on some issues. In vacating and 
remanding for recalculation of Richards' fees, this Court specifically stated that Richards must 
separate the time and fees according to the formula in Cottonwood Mall. 840 P.2d at 156 
n.12. Richards simply has not done that. 
Richards is only entided to fees under the breach of warranty claim, not on his fraud 
claim, his claim of breach of fiduciary duty or any of the issues on which he did not prevail 
or on which Brown prevailed, such as the real estate and rescission issues. The evidence 
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Richards presented on remand did not allocate attorney time or fees into the three 
Cottonwood Mall categories. In fact, the trial court found Richards' "proofs presented at 
the remand hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the remand instructions . . . ." 
(R. 5707) Richards could not make the required allocation because his attorneys did not keep 
records which divided time between compensable and non-compensable claims. 
Richards' attorneys knew the law concerning attorney fees. During his testimony at 
the January 31, 1995 hearing on the issue of attorney fees, Richards1 lead attorney, Robert S. 
Campbell, stated he had reviewed and knew the standards for award of attorney fees in Utah, 
(R. 6049, at 19, 20), he knew that no recovery of attorney fees was available for tort claims 
(R. 6049 at 106), and he knew immediately after his initial conference with Richards that the 
case involved both contract and tort claims (R. 6049 at 22-23). Mr. Campbell admitted he 
did not ever keep track of his time by specific claim (R. 6049 at 40) and that he never 
discussed with his partners and associates whether time recorded on their time sheets should 
be allocated between the breach of contract claim and the fraud claims. (R. 6049 at 87) 
The only reason given by Richards* attorneys for not keeping track of their time by 
specific claim was because it was "impractical" to do so. (R.6049, p.40) In essence, Richards* 
attorneys claimed they were not required to follow Utah law, which required an allocation 
of attorney time and expenses between compensable and non-compensable claims. In light 
of the cases dating to at least 1984 see, e ^ , Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 
1984), this excuse is simply untenable. In the face of Mr. Campbell's admissions, one can 
only conclude that the decision not to keep track of the time by specific claim was made in 
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the hope of recovering all fees. Indeed, Richards' attorneys espoused such a belief. 
Elizabeth T. Dunning testified at her deposition that even if the jury had awarded Richards 
nothing for fee-compensable breach of warranty damages, she believed Richards would still 
be entitled to an award of attorney fees! (R. 5227-8) Richards' attorneys continue to believe 
that they are entitled to recover all of the attorney fees for any time spent on this case. See. 
e.g.. Brief of Appellant at 30 n.3, 35. 
Richards' attorneys engaged in "block billing" in which all of the time spent in any 
one day on a client's case is billed as one block of time and no allocation is made among 
individual claims, whether they are compensable or not. (R. 5709) Not only did Richards' 
attorneys "block bill" their client, it seems that the underlying time sheets, which were never 
made available to the trial court, also made no allocation among the claims, which Richards 
was pursuing. In other words, the attorneys never separated work on the one claim, breach 
of warranty, for which Richards could recover fees, from other contract issues or from the 
tort claims which formed the bulk of Richards' case. (R. 5553, p.6-7) 
The inadequacy of Richards' fee evidence is also illustrated by the testimony of Ms. 
Dunning. Ms. Dunning admitted: that her predecessor's work in opposing Brown's early 
motion to dismiss the fraud claims was not properly deleted (R. 5225-6); that no effort was 
made to delete the work involved in proving fraud (R. 5226-7); that the fees for the failed 
rescission effort were included (R. 6050 p. 189-92); that there was no deletion for trial time 
spent on witnesses who testified about Hobbs meters on three non-inventory airplanes (such 
testimony was not illustrative of any contract damages) (R. 5226); and that no deductions 
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were made for trial time spent with witnesses who gave evidence other than that necessary 
to prove breach of warranty (R. 6050, p. 230) These admissions and Mr. Campbell's 
admissions show the disregard of the allocation criteria imposed by this Court. 
The lack of compliance with this Court's requirement of allocation and the effects of 
block billing can be further illustrated by examining three random days of billing records 
supplied by Richards' attorneys. 1) On April 16, 1988, attorney Frank Smith (Dunning's 
predecessor) billed 8.1 hours for: "Conference with D. K. Richards regarding preparation for 
J. Sharp deposition; interview J. Sharp and take deposition; follow-up telephone conference 
with client to report deposition results." (R. 4660 Addendum F) Parts of John Sharp's 
deposition were read by Richards at trial, and that testimony had nothing to do with breach 
of warranty claims or damages, yet all 8.1 hours of attorney Smith's time were deemed 
compensable by Richards in his submissions following this Court's remand. 2) On August 
6, 1988, after Ms. Dunning took over for Mr. Smith, Mr. Campbell billed 2 hours for 
"Conference with client; review case with Franklin N. Smith, Jr. and Elizabeth T. Dunning." 
Ms. Dunning also billed 2.0 hours for "Office conference with Franklin N. Smith, Jr., Robert 
S. Campbell, Jr. regarding status of case." (R. 4677 Addendum G) Each attorney billed for 
the same conference. No reductions and no explanations were made to explain what was 
discussed in these entries, why this meeting was necessary to prosecute breach of warranty 
or why each attorney was allowed to bill for what appeared to be duplicative time. Every 
part of each attorney's time that day was spent in getting Ms. Dunning "up to speed." 
Applying Utah law, Judge Thomas Greene stated "it is not reasonable to require [the 
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opposing party] to pay the attorney fees incurred by new . . . counsel 'getting up to speedf 
with the facts and issues of the case." Albert P. Smith Co. v. Albertsons. Inc.. 826 F. Supp. 
1299, 1301-02 (D. Utah 1993). 3) On December 5, 1988, Ms. Dunning billed 7.3 hours: 
"Review Brown Deposition; hearing on Motion for Extension of Discovery; office conference 
with Foote; telephone conference with Smith regarding witnesses; review Sharp deposition; 
draft memorandum regarding witnesses; office conference with Carolyn Cox; office 
conference with Robert S. Campbell, Jr.; telephone conference with D. Richards." (R. 4697 
Addendum H) Of the 7.3 hours billed, a 50% reduction was entered for only 1 hour. Yet, 
the entry reveals no indication of what discovery Ms. Dunning worked on, which witnesses 
the memorandum concerned, what her discussion with Ms. Cox concerned, or why the 
deposition was reviewed. On that same day Ms. Cox billed two hours for "Office conference 
with Elizabeth T. Dunning regarding documents; review of documents list." (Id.) This entry 
does not clarify what documents were discussed or reviewed in the conference or how those 
documents related solely to the breach of warranty claim. 
This type of analysis of the billing statements Richards supplied to the trial court on 
remand can be repeated for each of the hundreds of pages. They amply demonstrate 
Richards' inability to make the required allocation. The evidence supplied by Richards' 
attorneys is simply inadequate to support an award of attorney fees. None of these records 
specifically identifies time which was spent on the breach of warranty claim. Richards' 
attorneys made only a minimal effort to reduce the fees which they requested to reflect the 
amount of time spent on the breach of warranty claim. Some reductions were made when 
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the word "fraud" specifically appears in the billing records, but no entry supports the 
proposition that the time expended was spent solely on the breach of warranty claim. 
Brown had proposed to the trial court that Richards be required to prove the time 
spent on fee-compensable claims, an approach which seems to be suggested by the case law, 
rather than being allowed to start with the total time spent and simply make after-the-fact 
reductions based primarily on guesswork. (R. 4970, et seq.) However, the trial court 
shunned this bottom-up approach meaning haphazard reductions were made. 
An examination of Richards1 fee claims for attorney fees demonstrates that Richards 
claimed that nearly 80% of his fees should be awarded for an issue on which the recovery 
was less than 10% of the total award, and on which very little time was devoted at trial. 
Because Richards1 attorneys were unable to make the required allocations, the trial 
court had no evidence to support an appropriate allocation of attorney fees for compensable 
and non-compensable claims. The award of any attorney fees to Richards was "without 
adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be overruled." 
Redevelopment Agency, 785 P.2d, at 1126. See also Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988); Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah App. 1988). 
POINT II 
RICHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED ATTORNEY FEES 
FOR CALCULATING HIS ATTORNEY FEES. 
Richards should not have been allowed to benefit from his disregard of the remand 
when he failed to allocate time among compensable and non-compensable claims and 
unsuccessful claims, by then being awarded attorney fees for hundreds of hours spent in 
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futilely attempting to make such an allocation after the fact. Utah courts have granted 
attorney fees for the calculation and proving of fees only in very limited circumstances. 
Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) (Permitting an award of attorney fees for 
fees pursuant to a specific statute.); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 888 
P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) (Permitting fees for fees pursuant to a specific indemnity 
agreement between the parties.). But see Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 338 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (Utah 1998) (Denying a fees for fees application in a case in which the original 
attorney fees came from a "common fund."). 
The trial court initially denied Richards1 request for attorney fees incurred during his 
futile attempt to meet this Court's allocation requirements. (R. 5553,4) However, in its 
December 31, 1996 Minute Entry, subsequent to Richards' motion for reconsideration, the 
trial court stated: 
The Court has reconsidered its rulings on post-appeal fees and costs in light 
of the majority opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of David L. 
Salmon v. Davis County, et aL 916 P.2d 890 (in Utah 1996). In view of the 
majorities' [sic] allowance of fees incurred in seeking fees, the Court revisits the 
post-appeal fee and cost issue. 
As in all other fee claims, Richards' attorneys adduced evidence on the 
number of hours spent, their hourly rates, previously found by the Court to 
be consistent with those rates customarily charged in the community, and they 
generally describe the tasks performed, or services rendered. The billing to the 
clients were submitted in support of the time and services involved. The 
overall time expended by counsel post-appeal has been questioned by plaintiffs' 
counsel. 
In the announced decision of April 1, 1996, the claim for $78,169.32 
was disallowed by the Court for failure to allocate time and services. On 
reflection, the Court concludes it was wrong. Except for time expended on 
post-judgment lien and security problems and the form and content of 
supplemental Findings, Conclusions and post-appeal Judgments which includes 
some other issues involving accounting, interest computation, and possibly 
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others, the substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys has been directed 
to the attorney's fee, costs and relevant interest issues. 
(R. 05708-9) In its March 21, 1997 Findings of Fact, the trial court found: 
12. The Court has reconsidered Richards' claim for post-appeal fees 
in light of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion allowing fees incurred in seeking 
fees in Salmon v. Davis Co.. 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). 
13. The substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys post-
appeal, except for time expended on post-judgment lien and security issues, on 
the form and content of supplemental Findings, Conclusions and Post-Appeal 
Judgments (which include other issues involving accounting, interest 
computation, etc.), have been directed to attorney fees, costs and relevant 
interest issues. 
(R. 5880) Based on these findings the court reached the conclusion that: 
3. Defendants seek attorneys fees and costs incurred in post-appeal 
matters from November 1, 1993 through February 1, 1995 in the amount of 
$78,169.32. This amount is excessive and unreasonable. The Court finds that 
60% of that amount, or $46,901.59, is reasonable, with interest at 10% per 
annum from and after July 1, 1995 to the date of the post-appeal Judgment. 
(R. at 5881) 
The trial court's findings and conclusions regarding the awarding of Richards' attorney 
fees for the calculation of fees is based on an erroneous reading of Salmon. A proper reading 
of Salmon discloses: (1) the reasoning supporting the award of fees for fees in Salmon is not 
at all clear because of the supreme court's fragmentation, (2) the basis for the award of fees 
in Salmon was not the same as here, and (3) concerns raised in Salmon are present here. 
A close analysis of Salmon demonstrates its result is inapplicable here. 
The reasoning which supported the award of fees expended to obtain attorney fees 
in Salmon did not command a majority of the Utah Supreme Court. See Salmon. 916 P.2d 
at 900 (Zimmerman, C.J. concurring). Salmon involved the specific interpretation of a 
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statute, Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-2, which provided the sole basis for entitlement to fees. 
In contrast, fees in this case were awarded pursuant to contract. In Salmon. Justice Durham 
(writing for herself and Justice Stewart) concluded that the statute in question must be 
broadly construed to allow an award of attorney fees necessarily incurred in litigating to 
recover fees initially provided by the statute to prevent rendering such a fee shifting statute 
impotent. 916 P.2d at 894-96. Specifically, Justice Durham stated: "Consequently, if a 
vindicated employee is required to expend attorney fees to recover the original fees to which 
he was entitled, the cost of these subsequent fees must also be reimbursed. Any other 
interpretation would eviscerate the purpose of the statute." 916 P.2d at 896. Justice 
Durham's concern was heightened by the small amount of fees recovered in Salmon, 
something that is not a consideration here. However, in concurring in that result Chief 
Justice Zimmerman placed Justice Durham's concerns in perspective and pointed out a 
significant dissimilarity to the "normal contract case": 
Justice Durham analogized Salmonfs case to typical cases where attorney 
fees incurred on appeal are awarded whenever attorney fees were initially 
authorized by statute or contract. . . . 
However, Salmon could not raise the attorney fee issue in the 
underlying proceedings [in this case] because the County [from which he 
sought attorney fees] was not a party to the underlying criminal actions against 
him. This anomaly sets §63-30a-2 apart from the vast majority of our cases 
which rely on a statutory or contractual provision for attorney fees, where the 
attorney fee issue can be litigated in the same proceeding as the substantive 
right to which this award of fees is attached. 
Finally, an award of a reasonable fee for seeking defense fees will not 
encourage exorbitant fee requests or generate needless litigation. In 
determining a reasonable fee for the fee litigation, a district court has the 
discretion to assess whether the fee requested for the fee litigation is 
reasonable and whether the employee or employer unreasonably generated or 
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protracted the fee litigation. 
916 P.2d at 901-02. Justice Zimmerman's reasoning effectively distinguishes Salmon from 
this case. 
The county in Salmon exacerbated the attorney fees incurred by Salmon when it 
refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, disputed the amount which he claimed, and 
finally recommended that Salmon file a complaint to obtain a judicial ruling on the reasonable 
fees sought in order to disgorge fees from the county. 916 P.2d at 892. In other words, it 
was the opposing party, the county in Salmon's case, that "ran up the bill." Here, failure of 
the trial court to enter proper findings on Richards' fees forced the court of appeals to vacate 
the original fee award to Richards and remand the case for appropriate findings taking the 
three allocation categories into account. It was because the billings to Richards failed to 
make such an allocation that the allocation then attempted by Richards counsel consumed 
hundreds of hours' time, for which Richards now has received partial compensation. Here 
it was Richards, the party seeking fees, who "ran up the bill." It would not be proper to 
require Brown, a party who, unlike the county in Salmon, had no control over how much 
subsequent fees were incurred to obtain fees to pay the bill for Richards' attorneys doing so. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman made a second point in Salmon which also distinguishes 
that case. He noted that "an award of a reasonable fee for seeking defense fees will not 
encourage an exorbitant fee request or generate needless litigation." 916 P.2d at 902. This 
Court required Richards to make an appropriate allocation among compensable claims, non-
compensable claims, and unsuccessful claims. As a result, Richards' attorneys billed over 
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$78,000.00 in their failed attempt to make the required allocations, which should have been 
simply a matter of reviewing allocated time records. Had Richards' experienced attorneys 
followed the law from the beginning of this case and made appropriate allocations on their 
time and billing sheets, this matter would never have been raised in the first appeal. It was 
Richards' attorneys' failure to follow the law that necessitated the subsequent proceeding on 
attorney fees. Richards' attorneys were therefore allowed to spend hundreds of hours and 
tens of thousands of dollars to attempt to do that which should have been initially done but 
could never be done. To allow Richards now to benefit from his counsels' failure to follow 
the law is the grossest miscarriage of justice. 
Allowing reimbursement of fees for recovery of fees in a case such as this opens a 
Pandora's Box. In a case in which an attorney obtains a fee award which the attorney 
believes, for whatever reason, to be insufficient, a strong temptation exists to spend an 
inordinate amount of ti11le i tlle calculation of attorney fees to increase the recovery to a 
level the attorney may perceive as more reasonable. For this reason alone, fees incurred to 
calculate fees in a case such as this should not be awarded. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED 
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST TO RICHARDS ON ATTORNEY FEES. 
Richards should not have been awarded interest on attorney fees, to accrue before the 
amount of attorney fees was ascertainable. An award of prejudgment interest is proper only 
if the loss can be fixed as of a definite time and can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy. "[W]hen damages are uncertain or speculative until fixed by the fact finder, Utah 
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courts refuse to award prejudgment interest." James Constructors, 888 P.2d at 671. See also 
Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). Further, Richards' 
initial fee award was vacated and had to be computed by the trial court. 
In this case, the trial court considered James Constructors and concluded that 
"prejudgment interest on attorney fees is appropriate." (R. 5882) The trial court awarded 
accrued contract judgment interest at 10% per annum on the trial fees from the original 
October 18, 1990 judgment (R. 5874) The court also permitted prejudgment interest at 10% 
per annum to be awarded from February 3, 1995 on the appeal and post-appeal fees. ( id.) 
In making the awards of interest on the fees, the trial court not only misinterpreted James 
Constructors but misunderstood the ruling of this Court in the first appeal.5 
A. Pre-judgment interest on the fees award is not permissible here. 
The trial court's reliance on James Constructors in awarding interest on fees was 
misplaced. In James Constructors, this Court analyzed prior cases on pre-judgment interest 
on attorney fees, and concluded that those cases did not adequately address whether such 
interest was available for a fee award. The court looked to cases from other jurisdictions 
which have "consistently denied pre-judgment interest award on attorney fees when payment 
of the fees is contingent on a court's determination of their reasonableness." James 
^ h e terminology "pre-judgment" and "post-judgment" is somewhat confusing here. The 
interest on Richards' award of trial attorney fees can be seen in one aspect as post-judgment 
interest since it originated from the date of the original judgment. However, in another 
context the interest should be seen as pre-judgment interest since the interest predates the 
1997 judgment of the trial court. This requires analysis of two lines of cases, one concerning 
pre-judgment interest and the other concerning the award of post-judgment interest. Under 
either line of cases, Richards should not accrue interest on an award of attorney fees before 
the 1997 judgment. 
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Constructors. 888 P.2d at 672. Ultimately, this Court held that when the amount of fees can 
only be fixed when found reasonable by the trial court, the party awarded fees is not entided 
to pre-judgment interest. James Constructors. 888 P.2d at 673. 
The trial court in this case was similarly tasked with determining on remand the 
reasonableness of Richards'fees. Brown. 840 P.2d at 156. As in James Constructors. Brown 
contested the reasonableness of virtually every aspect of Richards' requested fees. Therefore, 
until the trial court found those fees to be reasonable (and in some instances it found them 
to be unreasonable, (R. 5710; R. 5553, p.7-8)), the attorney fees could not be fixed and 
therefore, should not have accrued pre-judgment interest. 
B. Because the court of appeals vacated the original award of attorney fees, no post-
judgment interest should have been awarded. 
In this case, the court of appeals vacated the award of attorney fees to Richards 
because of the trial court's findings supporting the award were inadequate. Black's Law 
Dictionary, at 1388 (5th Ed.), defines "vacate" to mean: "2. Annul; to set aside; to cancel 
or rescind. To render an act void; as, to vacate an entry of record, or a judgment." 
Richards1 entire fee claim was therefore before the trial court on remand and solely 
dependant tlpoit Richards1 supporting evidence. From that evidence, the trial court could 
find that Richards would receive no fees. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has suggested the following general rule regarding the 
determination of interest following an appeal: 
A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial court 
even though it is still subject to direct attack. When a judgment is modified 
upon appeal, either upward or downward, the new sum draws interest from 
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the date of entry of the original order, not from the date of the new judgment. 
On the other hand, when a judgment is reversed on appeal the new award 
subsequently entered by the trial court can bear interest only from the date of 
entry of such new judgment. 
Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp.. 754 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting 
Stockton Theaters. Inc. v. Palermo. 360 P.2d 76, 78 (Cal. 1961)). 
In Mason the trial court ruled in favor of Western; however, the appellate court 
reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in Mason's favor and 
determination of damages. Subsequently, the trial court entered judgment for Mason for 
damages and judgment interest. Mason. 754 P.2d at 985. In deciding Mason, this Court 
stated that it would follow the majority approach, holding that following reversal, judgment 
interest was appropriate only as of the date of entry of the new judgment, rather than as of 
the date of the original judgment. Icl at 986. 
Mason and its progeny, Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kureet. 876 P.2d 421, (Utah App. 1994) 
(Bailey I), stand for the proposition that in any case remanded to the trial court, judgment 
interest dates only from the entry of the new judgment. In this case, this Court clearly stated 
that it was "vacating" the award of attorney fees and remanding the case to the trial court 
for reconsideration. This Court upheld Richards' general entitlement to attorney fees under 
the contract but remanded it to the trial court for failure to provide adequate findings 
supporting the award. Brown. 840 P.2d at 155-56. Because the trial court on remand still 
had to determine whether Richards' evidence justified the requested fees, the action of the 
appellate court may be properly charactemed as an abandonment of the initial fee award to 
Richards. Thus, it was entirely possible that the trial court could have, and (as argued in 
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Point I) should have, found that Richards was entided to no fees because of his failure to 
make the required allocations. In Bailey L an original judgment had been entered in favor of 
the plaintiff in the trial court. The appellate court held that if the trial court on remand 
found that damages were still appropriate upon following the proper legal standards, 
judgment interest should be awarded from the date of entry of the new judgment only. 876 
P.2d at 427. This, the court treated the case as a reversal, even though any decision on 
remand would be in favor of the same party who won at trial exactly the situation here. 
As set by Bailey L in this jurisdiction any reversal, such as in this case, which could 
result in no fees being awarded is an abandonment of the initial judgment, meaning that any 
interest on a new judgment should run only from the date of that judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED 
THAT POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CARRIES THE INTEREST RATE 
OF THE OLD STATUTE RATHER THAN THE NEW STATUTE. 
Brown contends that the trial court's conclusion to use the judgment interest rate in 
effect at the time of the original judgment was erroneous. This is an issue of first impression 
in this jurisdiction. 
During the proceedings on remand, the statutory judgment interest rate changed. 
The prior Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4, provided: " [Non-contract] judgments shall 
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum." The May 3, 1993 modification of that statute 
provided: " [Non-contract] judgments shall bear interest at the federal post-judgment interest 
rate of January 1 of each year, plus 2%." Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4 (1996). Brown sought to 
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have all non-contract awards to Richards be subject to this change. (R. 5644-55) 
In his memorandum to the trial court Richards cited Kaiser Aluminum v. Bonjorno. 
494 US 827 (1990), for the proposition that when there is a legislative modification of the 
judgment interest rate during an appeal, the post-appeal judgment must bear the original rate 
of interest and not the modified interest rate. The trial court evidently also relied on that 
case in deciding to apply the original interest rate to judgments in this case. (R. 5711) 
However, Kaiser Aluminum was based on a 1982 change in the federal judgment 
interest statute, 28 USC §1961, providing: "Such interest shall be calculated from the date of 
entry of the judgment at a rate equal to [the T-bill rate] settled immediately prior to date of 
the judgment." (Emphasis added.) Far different from federal statute, the Utah statute contains 
no reference to "date of entry." The lack of such language in the Utah statute renders the 
Kaiser Aluminum result of no value here. However, The Court's analysis is useful: 
The starting point for interpretation of a statute "is the language of the statute 
itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. 
G.T.E. Sylvania. Inc.. 447 US 102, 108, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 
(1980). "By linking all post-judgment activity to the entry of a judgment, the courts 
have been provided a uniform time from which to determine post-judgment issues." 
Comment, Post-Judgment Interest in Federal Court, 37 Emory L.J. 495, 499 (1988). 
Both the original and the amended versions of §1961 refer specifically to the "date of 
judgment," which indicates a date certain. 
494 US at 835. 
This approach was taken by the Washington Court of Appeals: "The language of the 
act is clear. By providing that the interest rate as amended will apply to a judgment 'from 
the date of entry thereof,5 the legislature manifested an intent that the new interest rate apply 
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only to judgments entered after the act's effective date." Puget Sound Natl Bank v. St. Paul 
Etc.. 645 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Wash. App. 1982). Thus, by omitting specific reference to a date 
certain, the Utah legislature intended that judgments bear the statutory rate in effect at the 
time, to change each year. 
Arizonafs judgment interest statute, ARS §44-1201 (A) (1979) also contained no 
reference to a "date of entry." The Arizona Supreme Court held: ff[T]hat when the statute 
was changed, the legal rate of interest also changed, and the interest rate stated in the 
judgment statute is, absent specific agreement to the contrary, subject to later modification 
by statute." McBride v. Superior Court. 635 P.2d 178, 179 (Ariz. 1981). 
Here, the trial court failed to follow standard statutory interpretation. Statutory interest 
calculated on the non-contract awards in the 1997 judgment here should have taken into 
account the 1993 modification by calculating simple interest on the principal amounts 
awarded by the jury at 12% from the December 21, 1989 judgment through May 2, 1993, 
then at an interest rate of 5.72% from May 3, 1993 to December 31, 1993, then 5.61% for 
1994, then 9.22% for 1995, then 7.35% from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, then 
7.45% from January 1, 1997 to the date of judgment, from when the offset in Brown's favor 
would accrue contract interest (see Point VI below). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE BREACH OF WARRANTY DAMAGES. 
In this case, the trial court awarded Richards breach of warranty damages of $100,000 
and determined Richards was entitled to contract interest at a rate of 10% from April 24, 
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1984 through February 1, 1997. (R. 5873) The pre-judgment interest on breach of warranty 
damages amounted to an award of $56,630.14. As noted in Point III, pre-judgment interest 
will be supported only if damages can be ascertained with mathematical precision. James 
Constructors, 888 P.2d at 671. Richards is not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the 
breach of warranty damages for two reasons. First, the breach of warranty damages were not 
ascertainable with mathematical precision. Second, the original judgment did not provide for 
such interest. That lack of interest in the original judgment was not appealed by Richards. 
Pre-judgment interest is properly awarded only when "the loss had been fixed as of 
a definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in 
accordance with well-established rules of damages." Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 
(Utah 1991). This Court has stated that the lack of mathematical certainty prevents an award 
of pre-judgment interest. Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 
(Utah App. 1992); Price-Orem v. Rawlins. Brown and GunnelL 784 P.2d 465, 483 (Utah App. 
1989). In Price-Orem. a developer had been damaged as a result of an architect's negligence 
in drawing defective plans for a shopping center that omitted some property. To prove 
damages on this issue, the developer was required to introduce expert testimony to determine 
the fair market value of the lost area. The court of appeals held that pre-judgment interest 
was not appropriate because the damages could not be calculated with mathematical certainty, 
stating: 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be 
ascertained "in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards 
of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than 
be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed . ..." 
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784 P.2d at 483 (citation omitted). The court concluded that while the evidence in that case 
was sufficient to support the damage award, "It is far too uncertain to support a pre-
judgment interest award" because the formula used by the jury to calculate lost profits was 
far too speculative. 784 P.2d at 483. 
In this case, the jury was simply left to determine the damages incurred for the breach 
of warranty. The jury had the opportunity to utilize all, or none, of the testimony from 
various experts and all, or none, of the information contained in the exhibits or presented 
by witnesses to determine breach of warranty damages. The $100,000 awarded by the jury 
for breach of warranty does not relate to any particular exhibit or formula as testified to by 
any specific witnesses. Even if the jury had specifically relied on a particular exhibit or 
particular testimony, under Price-Orem pre-judgment interest still would not be appropriate 
here because the jury, in assessing the damage, was guided by its own best judgment. 
However, regardless of any mathematical precision problems, Richards still cannot 
claim pre-judgment interest on breach of warranty damages because he was not awarded any 
pre-judgment interest in the 1990 court judgment. That judgment awarded damages for 
breach of warranty "for the amount of $100,000 plus interest from the initial date of the 
verdict on April 22, 1989 . . . ." (R. 4094) No pre-judgment interest was awarded and 
Richards did not appeal the issue. Therefore, Richards is now foreclosed from seeking pre-
judgment interest because he did not challenge the trial court's original determination that 
pre-judgment interest was inappropriate. Richards' failure to raise this issue in his original 
appeal to this Court prevents him from seeking pre-judgment interest from the trial court on 
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remand. The trial court committed reversible error by making this award. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE OFFSET THE JUDGMENTS 
SO THAT ONLY ONE NET JUDGMENT RESULTED. 
The final judgment rendered in this case contains a variety of judgments for each side. 
(R. 5867-75; Addendum D) These judgments contain a variety of interest rates and starting 
dates. Despite Brown's request that the trial court consolidate all of these judgments into 
one net judgment in Brown's favor with one interest rate (the contract rate applicable to 
Brown's judgment), the trial court did not do so. (R. 5554) 
This Court has recently indicated that when claims and counterclaims in an action are 
related to the same or related subject matter, a trial court should enter only one net 
judgment. Bailey-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180, (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In Bailey 
II, the defendants complained because that portion of the judgment in their favor was 
applied as an offset to an original judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 945 P.2d at 192. This 
Court first stated that while some jurisdictions maintain an artificial distinction which 
prevents offsets, in Utah "the distinctions between counterclaims and setoffs have been 
dissolved." 945 P.2d at 192, citing Mark VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v. Smedley. 792 P.2d 
130, 133 (Utah App. 1990). The court then stated: 
Hence, we agree with the reasoning of the Ohio Court of Appeals that "[i]n 
a situation such as this where adverse claims are made relating to the same or 
related subject matter, the trial court may make findings in favor of either party 
but should render only one judgment and that in favor of the party having the 
greater amount due." Betz v. Timmons. 119 Ohio App. 239, 199 N.E.2d 22, 
23 (1963) 
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945 P.2d at 192-93. 
The reason supporting a single judgment was stated (in another context) by the U. S. 
Supreme Court in CitJ2ens Bank of Maryland V. Strumpf. 116 S.Ct. 286, 289 (1995): "The 
right of setoff (also called "offset") allows entities that owe each other money to apply their 
mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding 'the absurdity of making A pay B when B 
owes A.'" (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank. 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913)). To avoid such 
an absurdity and to prevent undue confusion and mistake, this case, with its multitude of 
related awards and interest rates deserves a judgment with a single sum and interest rate. 
POINT VII 
BROWN IS ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS ON THIS APPEAL. 
This appeal was necessitated by the trial court's inaccurate and incomplete findings of 
fact with respect to Richards' fees on the first appeal. Those incomplete findings were the 
result of Richards' failure to properly allocate time and expenses among compensable claims 
and non-compensable claims as required by Utah law. But for this failure, subsequent 
proceedings and this appeal would have been unnecessary. Therefore, should the court of 
appeals either sustain the trial court's reduced fee award to Richards or determine that 
Richards is entided to no fees, Brown will be the prevailing party on this appeal and, as such, 
is entided to his attorney fees and costs on this appeal. Management Servs. Corp. v. 
Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). 
RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED BY RICHARDS. 
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POINT VIII 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
TO RICHARDS WAS PROPER, THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF 
TRIAL, APPEAL AND POST-APPEAL FEES TO RICHARDS WAS 
APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Brown again emphasizes the point made in Point I — that Richards should receive 
no attorney fees whatsoever and that the trial court's award of any attorney fees to Richards 
was an abuse of discretion because Richards admittedly did not offer evidence of allocation 
of fees required by this Court. However, should this Court choose to address the adequacy 
of trial court's award to Richards, Brown asserts that the amount of attorney fees awarded 
to Richards for trial, appeal, and post-appeal work were appropriate. 
In his opening brief, Richards makes several allegations concerning alleged deficiencies 
in the trial court's calculation of trial fees, appeal fees and post-appeal fees. Specifically, 
Richards alleges that (1) the trial court erred in failing to award him fees for his defense of 
Brown's contract claim, (2) the trial court erred failing to award him all of his fees incurred 
pursuing the breach of warranty counterclaim, (3) the trial court's award of fees was not 
supported by sufficiendy detailed findings and conclusions, and (4) the trial court erred when 
it awarded him only 60% of his fees incurred on the appeal and post-appeal. Before 
addressing each argument, two shortcomings which afflict most or all of these issues must 
be discussed. Richards failed to meet the standard of review for each for each issue and, 
with respect to all but the first issue, Richards failed to support his arguments with citation 
to authority. Each of these flaws is fatal. 
A. Richards failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in the fee award. 
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Richards erroneously states that the standard of review for all but one of the attorney 
fees issues is correction of error. Only on one issue does Richards acknowledge the true 
standard with respect to these issues — abuse of discretion.6 Because he has not 
demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion, Richards failed to meet the burden 
imposed on him. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have clearly 
delineated the standard of review applicable to attorney fees cases. Specifically, an 
entitlement to fees in an action is a question of law which the appellate courts review for 
correctness. Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992). On remand 
the trial court here did not find that Richards was not entitied to fees, but rather, determined 
what portion of requested fees was compensable. Whether a trial courtfs findings in support 
of an award of attorney fees are sufficient, is a question of law also reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 
(Citing State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). However, critical to the resolution 
of this issue is the fact that a trial court has been granted "broad discretion in determining 
what constitutes a reasonable fee, and [the appellate courts] will consider that determination 
against an abuse-of-discretion standard." Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 991. A trial court 
is granted broad discretion in determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees "due to 
the trial judge's familiarity with that particular litigation and with attorney fees in general. ... 
The trial court has personal knowledge and first-hand experience with the litigation, the skill, 
6
 Only on his Point 1(C), concerning the sufficiency of the findings entered by the trial 
court, does Richards correcdy state his burden on appeal. However, even in that issue, he 
cites no case law which supports his claim and, more importandy, does not discuss case law 
which contradicts his claim. 
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the experience, and the effectiveness of the attorneys involved and attorney fees in general." 
Willey v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230, 232 (Utah 1997). For this reason, the trial court is much 
better suited to determine reasonable attorney fees than an appellate court, "which can only 
consider evidence that is in the record." Willey, 951 P.2d at 232. Finally, because of the trial 
court's advantaged position, the appellate court presumes that the "'discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the contrary/" Equitable Life 
and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Goddard v. 
Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)). 
The party contesting the amount of fees bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
court abused its discretion in the fee award. The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that 
a party attacking an award of attorney fees could not prevail because, among other reasons, 
the party did not marshal "the evidence supporting an award in this amount and then show 
that evidence to be legally insufficient." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, Case Nos. 960144, 960201 
slip op. at 8 (Utah Modified Opinion Filed June 26, 1998).7 Nowhere in his opening brief 
does Richards ever even attempt to marshal the evidence or demonstrate that the trial court's 
findings and conclusions were supported by adequate evidence and should be sustained. 
Throughout his opening brief, Richards boldly asserts that the evidence which he 
presented on fees was "unrefuted and uncontroverted." This allegation ignores hundreds of 
pages of transcript concerning the sufficiency and reasonableness of evidence Richards 
7
 Brown acknowledges that while Valcarce has not been released for publication and 
therefore is subject to amendment, the portion cited is to the amended opinion which simply 
states the standard of review for such claims. 
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submitted. Three-plus days of hearings consuming hundreds of pages of transcript and 
hundreds of pages of pre- and post-hearing filings demonstrate the contested nature of 
Richards' evidence. Yet even if the evidence was unrefuted and uncontroverted, the trial 
court may choose to disregard such evidence. For example, in Beckstrom v. Beckstrom. 578 
P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1978), an attorney offered undisputed evidence concerning the 
amount of fees that should be awarded. The trial court awarded about half the amount 
requested. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the award, saying, "Even though that evidence 
is undisputed, the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to accept such self-interested 
testimony whole cloth and make such an award; and in the absence of patent error or clear 
abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb his findings and judgment." (Emphasis added.) 
See also, Salmon, 916 P.2d at 899 (Russon, J.); Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 
P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1989) ("[A] trial court is not compelled to accept the self-serving 
testimony of a party requesting attorney fees even if there is no opposing testimony.") 
vacated on other grounds. 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). 
Here, Richards has failed to marshal the evidence and meet the required standard of 
review to show the trial cour abused its discretion in the award of attorney fees. 
B. This Court should not consider those issues raised by Richards which are unsupported 
by any citation to legal authority. 
Richards1 opening brief is remarkably devoid of any significant discussion concerning 
Utah attorney fee cases. Indeed, in his objections to the trial court's award of attorney fees, 
only one issue raised by Richards, concerning a lack of fees for his alleged successful defense 
of Brown's contract claim, has any significant citation to authority from any jurisdiction. 
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Issues IB, IC, II, and III contain no citations to authority to support their arguments. 
Therefore, this Court should not consider these arguments. Utah appellate courts require 
citation to authority to support arguments advanced by parties on appeal. In Selvage one of 
the parties advanced a theory concerning a basis for an award of attorneys fees. However, 
no authority was cited for this theory nor was there any further analysis as to why the 
opposing party should be liable for attorney fees. This Court stated "Mere assertions are not 
enough to defeat the application of the general rule that attorneys fees are proper only where 
authorized by statute or contract." Selvage. 910 P.2d at 1264-65. In reaching this conclusion, 
this Court cited Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which requires that 
"The argument shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes . . . relied on." See also 
State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 
(Utah App. 1990). 
As demonstrated in this brief, there is ample Utah authority on attorney fees. 
Richards totally avoids cases which "set the standard" and are most relevant, such as 
Cottonwood Mall and Dixie State Bank. Because Richards has failed to support many of his 
claims with citations to supporting authority, this Court should not address those issues. 
C. Richards' claim that the trial court erred in failing to award him fees for his 
"successful defense of Brown's contract claims" is disingenuous. 
Richards contends that he should have been given fees for his contract defense. 
However, the simple response to this is that whatever evidence presented to the trial court 
by Richards was insufficient to support such an award. In fact, Richards assiduously avoids 
the fact that he refused to allocate his fees among compensable claims, non-compensable 
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claims, and unsuccessful claims (R. 6049, p.87; R. 6050 p.240) and there is certainly no 
category in the fee application for "Fees for Successful Contract Defense.1' 
Utah appellate courts have frequently held that a refusal of a party to allocate among 
compensable, non-compensable and unsuccessful claims is a sufficient basis for a trial court 
to refuse to award attorney fees for such claims. In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1394 
(Utah App. 1994), this Court stated: 
In this case, the trial court denied the Harrigan's motion for attorney fees 
because only one of the Schafirfs claims stemmed from the contract and "any 
fees or costs uniquely applicable to the [open contractual] warranty claim are 
insignificant." Although the trial court could have attempted to allocate a 
portion of the fees to the contractual warranty claim, it decided against such 
action because "[i]t would not be appropriate." We believe that the trial court 
is in the best position to determine how much of the attorney's time was spent 
on each of the four issues. In addition, we think that the trial court should 
determine whether an allocation of fees is appropriate under the circumstances. 
In this case, the trial court felt it was inappropriate and we defer to its decision 
because there is no clear abuse of discretion. 
Similarly, in Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 269-270, the plaintiffs affidavit "did not 
distinguish between work done that was subject to a fee award and work that was not." The 
trial court therefore erred when it awarded fees. See also Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. 
Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981) (no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal to award fees 
where the requesting party failed to distinguish between time "spent prosecuting its complaint 
and the portion spent in defending the counterclaim"); Selvage, 910 P.2d at 1266 n.15 ("it 
may be proper to deny a request for attorney fees if the requesting party fails to allocate in 
accord with the directive of Cottonwood Mall "). 
Richards yet maintains that he defended the contract action on the basis that Brown 
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failed substantially to perform the agreements. (Richards Brief, p. 27) However, none of the 
four Answers filed by Richards before trial mentioned substantial performance as a defense. 
The phrase "substantial performance" was seked upon by Richards1 counsel only during trial 
and is now being used by Richards to justify his fee request. The trial court appropriately 
declined such an award. 
Richards admittedly did not make the required allocations. Therefore, responsibility 
for the trial court's refusal to award fees of Richards1 defense work is Richards'. Richards 
should not prosper from the admitted failure to follow this Court's directive. 
D. The trial court's award of Richards9 fees for his breach of warranty claim is 
appropriate given the quality of evidence and his refusal to allocate as required. 
In Point IB, Richards complains that the court erred by failing to award him all the 
fees which he allegedly incurred in connection with his breach of warranty counterclaim. 
Richards1 initial counterclaim sought tort recovery, as did each subsequent amendment. 
Richards' case was permeated with tort issues and evidence. Almost every witness called by 
Richards or cross-examined by Richards was asked a full diet of tort-related questions. 
Richards' meager efforts to distinguish between these unrecoverable fees and those 
recoverable fees incurred in connection with the breach of warranty counterclaim simply do 
not acknowledge the realities of this case. Indeed, as the trial court found, 
The theme of Richards1 case was fraud. Defendant's counsel carried that claim 
to the jury by clear and convincing evidence by far the greater quantity of 
evidence and the greater number of witnesses supported negligent 
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The result of the expenditure 
of time, efforts and expenses are clearly mirrored in the jury's verdict. 
(R. 5879). Any analysis of Richards' claim for attorney fees must examine the elements of 
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the breach of warranty claim and the separate and distinct elements of the fraud and 
misrepresentation claims. The Utah Supreme Court has held: "Unlike liability for negligence, 
which is based on fault, breach of warranty sounds in strict liability." Groen v. Tri-Q-Inc.» 
667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983). Thus, the jury was instructed that to recover on the warranty 
claim, Richards needed merely to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence (R. 2744), 
that the represented price of the assets was greater than the actual price of the assets. The 
jury was instructed that no evidence was necessary to show Brown's knowledge, past conduct 
or motive.8 (R. 2764) The court of appeals observed that no parol evidence was admissible 
to establish contract terms. Under this rule Richards was successful in his argument, Brown's 
parol evidence of integration was excluded and Brown lost $500,000 of the award on appeal. 
840 P.2d at 148. 
However, the jury was instructed that the claims of fraud and misrepresentation 
required Richards to meet a clear and convincing burden of proof, with a vastly expanded 
array of admissible evidence. (R. 2747) To establish the elements of fraud and 
misrepresentation, the jury was instructed that Richards was required to prove Brown's 
knowledge and motives. (R. 2757, 2759) As a result, Richards used otherwise inadmissible 
parol evidence to meet his burden for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. On remand, 
Richards' fee request did not include this disparity in the evidence and the burden of proof. 
Because Richards could not separate his warranty-related fees from fees for his other 
claims, the trial court was required to examine, among other things, which of the witnesses 
8Mr. Campbell said: "And as the court stated, the warranty doesn't turn or depend upon 
the motive or intention, or even good faith, of the representor." (R. 4226, p. 5081) 
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would not have been subject to cross-examination but for the tort allegations of fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. This was a rather difficult chore 
except for the fact that even a cursory review of at least ten of Richards1 witnesses9 reveals 
Richards1 unbridled pursuit of tort liability by repeatedly addressing evidence of Brown's 
knowledge and motive, evidence unnecessary on the contract claim. Even the parties testified 
extensively on non-warranty issues. Such evidence therefore was introduced for only one 
purpose — to prove fraud, to show Brown was deceitful, dishonest, unscrupulous and a liar. 
This evidence was wholly unnecessary, even inadmissible, on the breach of warranty issue. 
Richards vehemently argues that the factual issues of warranty and fraud overlap and 
that he is entitled to recover fees under the contract for the commonality of some facts. 
However, in answering the special interrogatories, the jury found that benefit of the bargain 
damages, even though available, were not appropriate for the warranty claims. (R. 2820) This 
suggests the jury instinctively understood the difference between ex delicto (from the tort) 
and ex contractu (from the contract) claims and found that the prior fraud, not the breach 
of warranty, caused Richards benefit of the bargain damages. Thus, Richards may not recover 
contract fees for a simple contract claim which followed in the wake of a very successful 
fraud case, unless the fees requested are separately identified and appropriate to only the 
^ h o s e witnesses were: Mark Rushton, Larry Steed, and Laslo Preyse, who all testified 
concerning Hobbs meters and reputation; Justin Eccles, who testified concerning the 
misrepresentations concerning one of the airplanes and reputation; Ralph Lewis, who testified 
concerning deicing and reputation; John Sharp, who testified concerning air craft use records; 
Phillip Upchurch, who testified concerning flight recorder of one of the airplanes; Barbara 
Hepner, who testified concerning reputation and service; and Lee Brown, Don Wittke, and 
Steven Featherstone who all testified concerning fiduciary duty. (R. 4976) 
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simple contract issue. 
Reductions made by Richards do not adequately distinguish between compensable 
breach of warranty claims and non-compensable fraud claims and are arbitrary and self-
serving. Richards explained the arbitrary decision not to allocate the fees for "factual 
development and discovery scheduling" with the cryptic phrase "because it would have been 
necessary regardless of the specific claim . . . [and] content. . . ." (R. 5125) Unquestionably 
most of the work spent in "factual development and discovery scheduling" was spent 
developing the facts supporting fraud and scheduling discovery of fraud witnesses. Richards1 
arbitrary reduction percentage for "Plaintiffs discovery" is reached by counting the number 
of interrogatories and requests, determining which were non-compensable issues and then 
making an arithmetic reduction. (R. 5126-9) But, that approach did not appear in 
"Preparation of answer and counterclaim" (R. 5126), where the court's previous 30% real 
estate reduction figure was applied. Yet, a quick check of Richards' initial counterclaim sought 
recovery on six claims, only one (or 17%) of which was the compensable breach of warranty 
claim. Richards' third amended counterclaim listed four causes of action, only one (25%) of 
which related to the contract. By the arbitrary method used for discovery, it would have 
been consistent to reduce the time spent for "preparation of answer and counterclaim," 
"factual development and discovery scheduling," and even "general trial preparation and trial" 
by 75% to 83%. Richards now complains because the trial court made its own calculations. 
The count-the-numbers reduction approach reappears in the "Jury Instructions and 
Special Interrogatories" category (R. 5134) and "general trial preparation and trial" category 
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(R. 5135) but in the latter no attempt was made to explain which exhibits or which witnesses 
supported non-compensable claims. Of the thirty witnesses, for which no reduction was 
made, it could fairly be said that virtually everyone of them testified at length concerning 
fraud-related issues. The trial court, in reaching its findings, recalled the days of testimony 
concerning inventory, Hobbs meters and deicing procedures, all of which concerned fraud 
or negligent misrepresentation. (R. 5303-4) That evidence had absolutely nothing to do with 
the contractual claims and all the fees incurred in developing and presenting it should have 
been excluded. Richards' current argument, that the trial court erred when it reduced his fees 
for the breach of warranty on the counterclaim, is simply disingenuous. That argument 
ignores the fact that it was he who refused to allocate among compensable claims, non-
compensable claims, and claims for which he was unsuccessful. Had this allocation been 
made as required by the court of appeals on remand, the trial court's task would have been 
infinitely easier and its conclusion far more accurate. Because Richards failed to do so, the 
trial court was left to its own devices concerning the calculation of fees. Richards should not 
now complain that the calculation used by the trial court was an abuse of discretion. 
E. The trial court's findings in this case were sufficient to support the fee award. 
In Point IC, Richards complains that the court's detailed findings are not adequate to 
support the award and this case should be remanded for additional findings. Brief of 
Appellant at 35-38. However, if such findings were appropriate at all, these are sufficient. 
Utah courts have established a rather low standard of for a trial court's findings of fact 
concerning an attorney fee award. For example, in Salmon. Justice Russon noted the trial 
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court's brief findings and stated that: ff[T]his Court has never directed trial courts to record 
the manner in which each factor affected the trial court's ultimate conclusion. Such a 
requirement is unnecessary." 916 P.2d at 897. Even Chief Justice Zimmerman, who formed 
a majority on this point, noted the findings were "minimal," yet acknowledged that the 
findings were "minimally sufficient to withstand a remand." 916 P.2d at 900-01. 
Here, findings of fact entered by the trial court consume eight pages. They 
acknowledge the shortcomings in Richards' evidence and refer to the factors listed in various 
opinions by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court which must be relied upon by a trial 
court in making its award of attorney fees. The findings and conclusions of the trial court 
here are far more extensive than those in Salmon which were upheld. If otherwise 
appropriate, the findings and conclusions are sufficient and should be upheld. 
F. The court's award of60% of Richards' appeal and post-appeal fees is sufficient. 
Richards complains that the trial court's award of 60% of his appeal and post-appeal 
attorney fees was insufficient. Any insufficiency in this award was caused by Richards' failure 
to allocate fees among compensable, non-compensable and unsuccessful claims. In other 
words, Richards forced the trial court to apply its own formulas in order to calculate fees. 
Now Richards complains that the trial court's formula was less than he desired. 
The court's minute entry of December 31, 1996, delineates the court's reasoning in 
arriving at the amount, including a lack of allocations required on remand. (R. 5706-13; 
Addendum B) The trial court concluded that, 
[Defendants' counsel allocates more time to defendants' successful claims on 
appeal and makes no allowance for the fact that plaintiffs prevailed on many 
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issues. The defendants' request of $134,751 for fees incurred on appeal and 
for defending Brown's unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme 
Court does not allocate those fees to any particular claims. The court finds 
that a more reasonable allocation in time and successfully pursuing the appeal 
would be 60% of the total fees expended by defendants' counsel or $80,987.28 
awarded to Richards for appeals fees. 
(R. 5881) The 60% multiplier for appeal and post appeal fees was arrived at by the trial 
court after determining that the main theme of Richards' case was fraud. (R. 5553 p. 6-8; 
R. 5710) The allocation of fees awarded by the trial court was just and appropriate and 
Richards should not now complain because he refused to comply with the remand order. 
POINT IX 
RICHARDS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ONLY TRADITIONAL COSTS. 
Richards claims he is entided to all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by his attorneys, 
such as expert witness fees to his accounting firm, long-distance telephone costs, photocopies 
and temporary services. Richards was awarded only his filing fees, witness fees, and service 
costs. (R. 5554, p. 9-10) 
The contract under which Richards recovered warranty damages provided that the 
prevailing party may "recover its reasonable attorney' fees and costs incurred in connection 
therewith." Brown. 840 P.2d at 154. The trial court ruled that the term "costs," as used in 
the contract, would be given "its usual and ordinary meaning." (R.5554) "Costs" as used in 
Rule 54 U.R.C.P., does not include the out-of-pocket expenses Richards claimed. See 
Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 1980) (medical and accident reconstruction 
expert witness fees not recoverable as costs); Hatanaka v. Struhs. 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 
App. 1987) (surveyor's fees not recoverable as costs). Citing Frampton and Hatanaka. this 
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Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah App. 1988), disallowed appraisal 
expenses as costs, observing: "The term "costs" as used under [Rule 54(d)(1) includes] court 
and witness fees which are required to be paid and for which a statute authorizes payment. 
Other expenses incurred in the preparation of litigation, even though necessary, are not 
chargeable as costsT (Emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Richards does not disagree with the trial courts legal conclusion. Instead, Richards 
argues that because the 1990 judgment considered "all costs and expenditures made in aid 
of litigation" in making its inseparable award of costs and fees (R. 4100), the trial court is 
now precluded from awarding Richards his traditional costs and correcting any mistakes. 
However, it was this inseparable award of attorneys fees and costs to Richards that was 
vacated by this Court because the trial courtfs findings were inadequate. 840 P.2d at 156. 
Because this fee and cost award was vacated, it could not have the effect of res 
judicata. When Richards1 judgment for fees, which inseparably included costs, was vacated, 
the trial court's reasoning behind the judgment was similarly discarded. The trial court was 
then required to enter specific findings and conclusions addressing each of the separate 
components of Richards' request for fees and costs. The trial court specifically determined 
that the term "costs" must be given its traditional meaning. 
Even if the trial court's correct analysis of costs could be construed as a revision of 
an earlier ruling, nothing prevents a trial judge from correcting an earlier error. See Gillmor 
v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring). Here, the award of fees 
and costs were inseparably connected by inadequate findings. When the fees award was 
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vacated, with the admonition to make adequate findings, the trial judge properly addressed 
the matter of costs and treated it correctly. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED FEES TO BROWN FOR 
RESISTING RICHARDS' UNSUCCESSFUL RESCISSION CLAIM. 
Richards does not dispute the reasonableness of the fees awarded to Brown for 
resisting Richards1 rescission claims. Instead, Richards claims that the trial judge erred in 
awarding any such fees to Brown. Richards suggests these fees were part of the fees the trial 
court originally awarded to Brown in 1990. 
Richards* initial counterclaim for rescission sought cancellation of all the agreements 
between the parties, along with tort claims and a claim to enforce the "Asset Sale and 
Purchase" agreement. (R. 103-08) Since these claims for relief were mutually exclusive, 
Richards was eventually forced to drop his claim to rescind all the agreements in favor of his 
single contract claim and multiple tort claims. (R. 1108) The 1990 final judgment awarded 
$250,000 in fees to Brown only "on the issues related to the sale of the Interwest building." 
(R. 4100) This award in no way included all of Brownfs fees for successfully resisting 
Richards' all-encompassing rescission claim. Brown successfully appealed the trial court's 
failure to award such fees and this Court agreed, "even if such efforts were not a significant 
portion of the overall lawsuit." 840 P.2d at 155. 
The claim that these fees were included in Judge Rigtrupfs uncontested award of fees 
to Brown is incorrect. The trial court obviously agreed with this Court's assessment that the 
efforts to successfully resist Richards' claim to rescind all the agreements were not included 
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in the previous award of fees to Brown. Noting that Richards' did not contest the fee 
amount sought by Brown, the trial court simply awarded them to Brown. 
Perhaps the real reason for Richards' appeal of this straightforward issue is to divert 
attention from his inclusion of rescission fees in his present fee request. Richards did not 
seek fees for his rescission efforts in his fee application immediately after trial: "[W]ith regard 
to the rescission issue, we don't claim any attorney's fees, Judge, for the time we spent in 
connection with that issue." (R. 4228, p. 5338) However, Richards included fees for his failed 
rescission effort in his present application. (R. 5225; R. 6050, pp. 189-92) Such a position 
is illogical. "They may not void the contract and, at the same time, claim the benefit of the 
provision for attorney fees." BLT Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) 
(citation omitted). This about-face is another example of Richards' failure to allocate fees as 
directed by this Court and is improper in light of this Court's determination that Brown was 
successful on the rescission claims, not Richards. 
POINT XI 
RICHARDS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO FEES ON APPEAL. 
Richards requests an award of attorney fees for the appeal of this matter. Such a 
request can only be termed outrageous. A party who has been awarded attorney fees at trial 
is also entitled to attorney fees and costs if that party prevails on appeal. Gardner v. Madsen. 
949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah App. 1997), citing Living Scriptures v. Cudlik. 890 P.2d 7,11 (Utah 
App. 1995). The court of appeals should not even consider awarding Richards fees on 
appeal even should he prevail on the appeal. It was Richards' own dogmatic and obstinate 
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refusal to allocate fees which generated all of the issues which he now raises on appeal. 
Awarding Richards fees on appeal would simply reward him for his failure to comply with 
this Court's remand order. 
CONCLUSION 
On the cross-appeal, Brown requests that this Court: (1) vacate the award of attorney 
fees to Richards, (2) vacate the award of attorney fees for calculating fees, (3) vacate the 
award of interest on the attorney fees, (4) reverse the trial court's judgment that interest carry 
the applicable rate of interest in effect at the time of the judgment, (5) vacate the award of 
pre-judgment interest on the breach of warranty claim, (6) reverse the trial court's decision 
that the judgments should not offset, with multiple interest rates, and (7) award Brown 
attorney fees for this appeal. Brown then requests that the case be remanded for entry of 
appropriate orders. 
On the issues raised by Richards, Brown requests that this Court: (1) if it rules the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by awarding any fees to Richards, affirm the trial court's 
ruling on the amount of attorney fees awarded to Richards, (2) deny Richards any fees for 
this appeal, (3) affirm the trial court's award of costs to Richards, and (4) affirm the trial 
court's award of attorney fees to Brown on the rescission claim. 
DATED this / f e > 7 ^ day of August, 1998. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
BRUTE E. COKE, Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs, Appellees and Cross-Appellants 
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1 Also this Court has &ae^dil£Cte&to 
2 redetermine the amount of attorney fefs dne Richards 
3 through trial. $.J(f0$&:> 
4 The Court of Appeals reversed this Court 
5 for its failure to award Brown attorneys1 fees for 
6 his successful efforts in enforcing his contractual 
7 rights unrelated to the sale of Interwest assets, 
8 which this Court needs to determine. 
9 The Court of Appeals has concluded that 
10 Richards was the prevailing party on appeal. 
11 Both parties were directed on remand to 
12 make their respective evidentiary showings of 
13 reasonable fees pertaining to the appeal as outlined 
14 in the Court's opinion. 
15 Finally, the judgment will require 
16 correction to reinstate the jury's verdict that 
17 Richards was entitled to $100,000 on his breach of 
18 warranty claim. 
19 Also, the issues of tax and related costs 
20 is before this Court. 
21 Richards, in the fee hearing before this 
22 Court, has asserted a claim for fees incurred in 
23 going forward with the fee hearing. 
24 The Court of Appeals observed that in 
25 this case the award of attorneys' fees is a complex 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is in the case of Boyd 
3 J. Brown versus David K. Richards, et al.; 
4 FileC87-1411. 
5 We've got pending the motion to Lift 
6 Judgment Lien and Request for Hearing. Before we 
7 address that motion, let me share my decision with 
8 you. 
9 Messrs. Coke and Call, before you are too 
10 hasty in your criticism, I'd call upon you to reflect 
11 on the earlier award of fees which you had. And I 
12 realize they weren't appealed, but I've kept that in 
13 mind in the award of fees to Mr. Richards. And I 
14 think if it can be said that the task of the 
15 Defendants in pursing their fraud claims was large in 
16 comparison to all the other tasks, on the other side 
17 of the coin the task in defending the fraud claims 
18 was a rather large task on the part of Mr. Brown and 
19 occupied a good deal of your time. So I did try to 
20 keep some balance in terms of what I had done in the 
21 past, though I realize that fee went unchallenged. 
22 On remand, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
23 directed the Court to recalculate Defendant's 
24 outstanding balance and interest owing on the 
25 Interwest Purchase Agreement at time of trial. 
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1 matter due to the adjudication of multiple claims 
2 arising under several contracts with each party 
3 winning some and losing some. This Court heartily 
4 agrees. 
5 In Footnote 12 on the same page the 
6 appeals court directed on remand Richards must set 
7 out the time and fees expended for successful claims 
8 which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, 
9 unsuccessful claims for which there would have been 
10 an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
11 successful and claims for which there is no 
12 entitlement to attorney fees. 
13 The trial court's findings should then 
14 mirror the foregoing categories so they may be 
15 reviewable. 
16 The recalculation of Defendant's 
17 outstanding balance and interest due on the Interwest 
18 Purchase Agreement is based on the accountings 
19 contained in Exhibits P-6 and P-l 1. Making the 
20 $500,000 adjustment and arriving at the new balance 
21 due involves the process of mathematical calculation 
22 which the Court assumes can be accomplished between 
23 the parties. 
24 The total time expended by the attorneys 
25 for both sides was reasonably close and to some 
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1 extent validates the overall reasonableness of time 
2 and services rendered by the attorneys in pursuing 
3 the case to conclusion. 
4 The hourly billing rates charged by 
5 counsel for Defendant, while somewhat higher than 
6 those by billed by Plaintiff's attorneys, were 
7 nonetheless generally consistent with rates 
8 customarily charged in the community for similar 
9 services considering the complexities of the 
10 litigation involved and the experience and skills of 
11 Defendant' s counsel. 
12 Mr. Campbell testified that counsel for 
13 Defendant did not allocate time based on individual 
14 claims, and they do not to this day because of the 
15 impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult, 
16 if not impossible in many instances, to know how 
17 efforts made might relate to one claim or another. 
18 There was an overlapping of the warranty evidence and 
19 fraud evidence such that one could not allocate the 
20 time expended to one claim or to the other with any 
21 degree of precision. The entries in the billing of 
22 Defendant's counsel are like those of counsel for 
23 Plaintiffs, quite general and vague. Over 200 hours 
24 were expended by counsel for Defendants in allocating 
25 time expended in this case. 
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1 Out of $1,450,000 found by the jury in 
2 favor of Richards, only 100,000 was found by the jury 
3 as damages relating to breach of warranties. In 
4 achieving that result, counsel for Defendants in 
5 pursuing the claims of the counterclaim dealt with 
6 the issues of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
7 breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, 
8 punitive damages and damages. In addition, they 
9 pursued a claim for rescission, which ultimately was 
10 dropped prior to trial. Also, a part performance 
11 claim was asserted by them when the case was 
12 submitted to the jury. 
13 In defending Plaintiffs complaint, they 
14 dealt with issues relating to the sale of assets as 
15 well as issues relating to the sale of the building, 
16 which generally were less difficult and more straight 
17 forward. They dealt with tax issues, rent issues, 
18 continuance problems, the extended problems relating 
19 to Defendant's damage claims, efforts in seeking 
20 mandamus, problems relating to the undertaking of 
21 security and other miscellaneous problems along the 
22 way. 
23 The theme of Richards' case was fraud. 
24 They carried that claim to the Jury by clear and 
25 convincing evidence. By far the greater quantity of 
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I 1 evidence and the greater number of witnesses 
2 supported negligent misrepresentation and breach of 
3 fiduciary duty. The result of expenditure bf time, 
4 efforts and expenses are fairly mirrored in the 
5 Jury's verdict. 
6 Considering all of the foregoing, the 
7 Court concludes and finds that the allegation of 
8 Defendant's counsel allocates more time to 
9 Defendant's claims of breach warranty than are 
10 reasonable and fair. The Court finds that a more 
II reasonable allocation of time expended in 
12 successfully pursuing that claim would be generally 
13 35 percent of the total time expended through trial 
14 or allowable fees of S218,986.42 to Richards. 
15 The Defendants successfully defeated 
16 Plaintiff's claim to an increased purchase price of 
17 500,000 for the Interwest assets when Richards did 
18 not exercise the option to purchase the Executive Air 
19 Terminal building, which was a significant appeal 
20 issue on which Defendants prevailed. In addition, 
21 they successfully reinstated the SI00,000 breach of 
22 warranty verdict on appeal. 
23 Brown and Interwest, on the other hand, 
24 successfully defended Richards' claims for rescission 
25 for which Brown was entitled to an award of fees. 
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1 Finally, Brown and Interwest prevailed in 
2 defeating the fees award by the trial court to 
3 Richards through trial. 
4 There were a number of other issues 
5 raised on appeal which were considered but were not 
6 treated by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 
7 Considering the foregoing, the Court 
8 concludes and finds that the allocation of 
9 Defendants' counsel allocates more time to the claims 
10 Defendants prevailed on on appeal, and makes no 
11 allowance for the fact that Plaintiffs prevailed on 
12 any issues. The Court finds that a more reasonable 
13 allocation of time in successfully pursuing the 
14 appeal would be 60 percent of the total time 
15 expended, or an allowable fee to Richards on appeal 
16 of $80,987.28. 
17 Defendants seek an award of $ 134,751 for 
18 fees incurred in appellate review and in a petition 
19 to the Utah Supreme Court for certiori, which was not 
20 accepted No effort was made by counsel for 
21 Defendants to allocate those fees to any particular 
22 claims; accordingly, those fees are disallowed. 
23 Additionally, Defendants seek attorneys' 
24 fees and costs post-appeal from November 1, 1993, 
25 through February 1, 1995, in the amount of 
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1 S78,l69.32. Again, no allocation thereof has been 
2 made, and those fees and costs are disallowed 
3 There appears to be no dispute in Brown*s 
4 claims for fees incurred in successfully resisting 
5 Richard's rescission claim; accordingly, Brown is 
6 awarded judgment against Richards for these fees in 
7 the amount of $7,879.50. 
8 The contract language in question 
9 provides for the recovery to the prevailing party of 
10 its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The Court 
11 construes "costs" in its usual and ordinary meaning. 
12 There appear to be no dispute — appears to be no 
13 dispute in Defendants'appellate costs. Defendants 
14 are awarded their costs incurred on appeal in the 
15 amount of $1,835.09. 
16 Defendants' filing fees of $235 are not 
17 contested and are recoverable. They are allowed and 
18 taxed. 
19 While the witness fees of $955 are not 
20 specifically attributed to particular witnesses, when 
21 divided by 35, little more than the statutory witness 
22 fee plus modest mileage results; accordingly, the 
23 full $955 is allowed and taxed. 
24 The Court concludes that other identified 
25 expenses and costs are not properly recoverable as 
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1 costs; accordingly, the Defendants are awarded total 
2 trial costs of $1,190. 
3 Notwithstanding any prior rulings on 
4 interest, under James Constructers Inc. v. Salt Lake 
5 City Corporation, prejudgment interest is not 
6 appropriate. However, the issues herein were finally 
7 submitted to Court by Plaintiffs summary, however 
8 relief requested and filed with this court February 
9 3,1995. 
10 The Court concludes that it would be -
111 it would be fair and reasonable to award interest on ! 
12 the amounts awarded herein at the rate of ten percent 
13 per annum from and after February 3, 1995. 
14 The Court is uncertain as to who will owe 
15 who when this is all factored into the judgment. 
16 Plaintiffs' counsel are requested to incorporate 
17 these rulings into the former judgment, prior 
18 interest rulings of the Court and the rulings of the 
19 Utah Court of Appeals and submit a final judgment 
20 approved as to form by Defendants' counsel. 
21 How long, Mr. Coke, do you need to do 
22 that task? 
23 MR. COKE: A week? Considering what I 
24 have on my plate already. 
25 THE COURT: I did that because when the 
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1 other side does the proposals you object to them 
2 I'm not so sure that you can do any better, but I am 
3 going to give you a try. And I assume you'll confer 
4 with them as you go along and as you trip into 
5 problems and hopefully get it done and concluded. 
6 MR. COKE: I can do that. 
7 MS. DUNNING: May I, Your Honor? 
8 When you talk about James Constructers 
9 and no prejudgment interest being proper, I assume 
10 that's on the attorney fees? 
11 THE COURT: Yes, attorney fees and costs. 
12 MS. DUNNING: Not on the SI00,000, which 
13 was -
14 THE COURT: No. I think that SI00,000 
15 should go clear back to the time of the Special 
16 Verdict. 
17 MS. DUNNING: That was your previous 
18 ruling, and I wanted to make sure that we didn't 
19 have --
20 THE COURT: I made a number of rulings. 
21 I didn't sign an order because I got an objection. 
22 We never did have a hearing. And I still have those 
23 orders. The only rulings I intended to retreat on 
24 were the ones that were reflected in the James 
25 Construction decision that relates to fees. 1 
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1 MS. DUNNING: Your Honor, in the interim 
2 while we are working on this order, which in the past 
3 has been a very lengthy process, will the Court lift 
4 the judgment lien on Mr. Richards' property so that 
5 - I don't think the difference, given where we are, 
6 is going to be so enormous that Mr. Brown is at any 
7 risk in the interim for being unsecured. 
8 THE COURT: I think you are going to be 
9 fairly close, is my guess, but - and I've kind of 
10 roughed it out in my mind at least, and it seems to 
11 me that the end result is not going to be far apart. 
12 MS DUNNING: Right. So, in the 
13 meantime, Mr. Richards has got a development project 
14 on some land in Salt Lake County winch was the 
15 subject of the most recent request to lift the 
16 judgment lien. And he -
17 THE COURT: Is another ten days going to 
18 cause a problem -
19 MS. DUNNING: Well -
20 THE COURT: - if we can get the final 
21 judgment done and entered? And then we know what it 
22 is. 
23 MS. DUNNING: The question is, is there 
24 any really likelihood that this will be done in ten 
25 days. And I think the answer is not Mr. Coke said 
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1 he has some other pressing things he has to do 
2 first. And our history was it took eight months to 
3 do the first judgment . I am just concerned that it 
4 is not - - 1 think i t ' s going to be weeks before w e 
5 are back before you. If the Court -
6 THE COURT: How much have we got in 
7 S u m m i t County? 
8 MS. DUNNING: I think it is about 1,900 
9 acres. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Coke, do you want to 
11 respond? 
12 MR. COKE: The reason I asked the Court 
13 to rule is so that I could then discern what it is . 
14 If it is discerned by me from your order and looking 
15 at m y files, the amount is, as suggested, small , 
16 then, of course, I don' t have any problems. On the 
17 other hand, I don ' t know anything about the S u m m i t 
18 Coun ty property other than it is Summi t Coun ty 
19 property. And it may be worth a lot of money; it m a y 
20 not be worth anything. It is not nearly as nice as 
21 having interest in the proceeds from a sale which I 
22 waived. And I am not trying to be an obstructionist 
23 here. I am trying to be sensible because I am the 
24 one that has to waive it. M y client is away. 
25 THE COURT: I think I ought to decide the 
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1 issue by the end of the week. And I ought to give 
2 you a chance at least to take what you ' ve got and 
3 rough it out in your mind and review it and see if 
4 you can ascertain what the difference is. I think it 
5 is fairly close. And if it is, then we ought to free 
6 up everything other than is essential to secure wha t 
7 there is left. 
8 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, can ' t the 
9 Cour t s imply order us to jus t submit an order o r a 
10 j udgmen t incorporating the Cour t ' s rulings in ten 
11 days? I mean, these are — these are now ari thmetic 
12 numbers -
13 THE COURT: I think they are. 
14 MR. CAMPBELL: - 1 think that no one can 
i 15 dispute. They may not like it one w a y or the other, 
16 but the judgment is subject right now to very finite, 
17 precise calculation, and we ought to be able to get 
18 that back to the Court in ten days. If we don ' t do I 
19 that and the Court doesn't order it, it will be weeks 
20 before we do it. 
21 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Coke says a week, 
22 and so I assume we can have it done in a week and 
23 submi t it for approval and know where we are. I 
24 w o u l d invite - although I have been in trial for 
25 about five weeks and we' l l start another one 
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1 Wednesday, I 'm available early in the morning or late 
2 at night or the noon hour or whatever, and I would 
3 invite conference calls to get off center and get it 
4 done. So -
5 MR. CAMPBELL: Would the Court -
6 THE COURT: - today is the - I think we 
7 ought to have the final judgment submit ted by the 
8 10th of April, and then I ' l l rule on the extent of 
9 the security left and complete it. 
10 MR. CAMPBELL: In the arriving of the 
11 amount and the calculation of attorneys fees, Your 
12 Honor, the Court indicated some general numbers of 35 
13 percent and 60 percent, respectively, for attorney 
14 fees at trial and on appeal. But did the Court make 
15 a calculation or follow-up methodology in arriving at 
16 the amount that is set forth of the 200 and - for 
17 example, the -- the amount of S218,000 the Court 
18 awarded for Richards in the allocation? Was that 
19 based on 35 percent of the total amount that Richards 
20 submitted to the Court, or is that based on an hourly 
21 calculation of the number of hours that were spent 
22 and the calculation of those hours? 
23 THE COURT: First I surveyed and reviewed 
24 the evidence that was first presented on the total 
25 hours by both attorneys on both sides. I went back 
_ _ 
1 and reviewed what I had awarded Mr. Brown for his 
2 efforts. And then I went back and reviewed the t ime 
3 expended at trial, all the claims and the general 
4 tasks that were involved. And based upon that, I 
5 took 35 percent of your claimed t ime and hours 
6 through trial and awarded that amount. 
7 Then on the appeal t ime, I went back and 
8 surveyed as best I could, keeping in m i n d that the 
9 Court of Appeals said there were a number of issues 
10 that were asserted but weren ' t — and were considered 
11 but not treated in their decision. I did not have 
12 those briefs. But, overall, I reviewed the claims 
13 that they treated specifically and how that compared 
14 with what was tried, and awarded 60 percent of those 
15 hours in the t ime expended in the appellate process, 
16 and then disallowed everything post-appeal. 
17 MR. COKE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
! 18 MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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The Court announced its oral decision in the attorney's 
fees/cost issues on April 1, 1996. Thereafter, defendants filed a 
Motion for Further Reconsideration of the Court's April 1, 1996 
Ruling Regarding Attorney's Fees. Also, defendants filed Richards' 
Objection and to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Richards' Motion 
for Reconsideration. Following replies thereto, the Court heard 
oral arguments thereon on June 17, 1996. Because some of the 
materials and case law was submitted too late for the Court's 
consideration and the Court wanted to further consider its rulings 
on the post-appeal fees and costs, the matter was taken under 
advisement. 
A r« - ^' r, r. 
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The Court has now had an opportunity to review and consider 
the authorities submitted and has recanvassed considerable 
materials. 
Any attack on fees found by this Court to be reasonable for 
Richards is unwarranted by a comparison with fees awarded earlier 
by this Court to Brown. The Brown fees were not appealed, while 
the Richards' fees were, thus subjecting the Richards' fees to a 
review consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Although counsel may criticize the methodology directed 
to be utilized by this Court in arriving at reasonable fees, this 
Court has no similar freedom. Even though the proofs presented at 
remand hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the Court of 
Appeals' remand instructions, the Court nonetheless made a 
significant effort to consider the factors outlined by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in arriving at reasonable fees to be awarded 
Richards. 
The fees of $218,986.42 found to be reasonable by the Court 
for services rendered by counsel for Richards through trial shall 
remain the same as previously announced by the Court in its April 
1, 1996 oral decision. Also, the $80,987.28 found to be reasonable 
by the Court for services rendered by counsel for Richards on the 
appeal shall remain the same. In addition, the Court's rulings on 
oo^yoj 0 0 37 01 
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costs were based on the usual and ordinary interpretation of the 
word "costs" used in the contract; and the rulings on costs shall 
remain as previously made. The broader term "expenses" was not 
used in the contract. 
The Court has reconsidered its rulings on post-appeal fees and 
costs in light of the majority opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of David L. Salmon v. Davis County, et al., 916 P.2d 890 
(Utah 1996) . In view of the majorities' allowance of fees incurred 
in seeking fees, the Court revisits the post-appeal fee and cost 
issue. 
As in all other fee claims, Richards' attorneys adduced 
evidence on the number of hours spent, their hourly rates, 
previously found by the Court to be consistent with those rates 
customarily charged in the community, and they generally described 
the tasks performed, or services rendered. The billings to the 
clients were submitted in support of the time and services 
involved. The overall time expended by counsel post-appeal has 
been questioned by plaintiffs' counsel. 
In the announced decision of April 1, 1996, the claim for 
$78,169.32 was disallowed by the Court for failure to allocate time 
and services. On reflection, the Court concludes it was wrong. 
Except for time expended on post-judgment lien and security 
00€70<8 
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problems and the form and content of supplemental Findings, 
Conclusions and post-appeal Judgments, which include some other 
issues involving accounting, interest computation and possibly 
others, the substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys has 
been directed to the attorney's fee, costs and relevant interest 
issues. 
The Court finds that counsel for Richards used "block billing" 
in this case. The testimony of George T. Naegle and David B. 
Thompson on time recording and billing practices, i.e., recording 
time and billing therefore for specific tasks was very credible. 
As Mr. Naegle testified, the insurance industry has required 
particualrized billings since the late 1980's. Moreover, their 
testimony is consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in this case and in the earlier pronouncements of 
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 
Because time was not entered and accounted for by specific 
tasks, the internal accounting system could not mechanically 
allocate time. As a result, many needless hours were expended 
manually allocating time, which could have been much more 
efficiently handled as an accounting function. Moreover, many 
hours and much expense has been incurred in the fee debate. 
OOQlO^ f; 0 •:v: "* v 
BROWN V. RICHARDS PAGE FIVE MINUTE ENTRY 
The combined fee-cost request of $78,169.32 for post-appeal 
time and expense is found by the Court to be excessive and 
unreasonable. Allowing 60% thereof is found by the Court to 
achieve a more reasonable allowance. Accordingly, in addition to 
the amounts awarded in the April 1, 1996 decision, the Court finds 
it reasonable to award defendants' counsel an additional $46,901.59 
in fees for post-appeal time and expenses, with interest thereon at 
the rate of 10% per annum from and after July 1, 1995 to date of 
post-appeal judgment. 
With respect to the post-judgment interest issue, the Court 
has again reviewed the James Constructors, Inc. case, Mason v. 
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988), 
and the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case. This 
Court found what it had determined to be reasonable fees through 
trial for both Brown and Richards and entered Judgment thereon on 
October 18, 1990. Although Presiding Judge Bench at page 157 of 
the decision reported in 840 P. 2d 143 indicated the award was 
"vacated", it is clear that the case was remanded "for a 
redetermination of the amount of fees." Based thereon, the 
rationale of the Mason case is applicable. Accordingly, defendants 
Richards are awarded post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum on the $218,986.42 from and after October 18, 1990 until paid 
OQ<Z1\0 
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or satisfied. The Court concludes that all Judgment rates of 
interest are the applicable statutory interest rate at the date of 
entry of the Judgment, and said Judgment rate shall remain 
throughout the life of the Judgment. All other amounts awarded in 
the bench decision of April 1, 1996 and the $46,901.59 awarded 
herein shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and 
after February 3, 1995 to date of Judgment, with the applicable 
Judgment rate thereon applying as of the date of the entry of the 
post-appeal Judgment and to continue in force and effect until paid 
or fully satisfied. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Attorney's Fees and 
Defendants7 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Supplemental Attorney's Fees have been reviewed in light of 
defendants' Objections. The post-appeal Findings and Conclusions 
need to be supplemented. The Court has reviewed plaintiffs' claim 
for supplemental fees in the amount of $7,879.50. The Court finds 
that the time expended by Brown's attorneys in successfully 
defending against Richards' efforts to rescind contracts unrelated 
to the sale of Interwest assets and in successful efforts in 
enforcing contractual rights unrelated to the sale of Interwest 
assets was reasonable, that their hourly rates were appropriate and 
well within the rates customarily charged in the community for such 
OOG1H
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charges. The Court finds the amount of $7,879.50 to be a 
reasonable charge for the services rendered, and concludes that 
Brown should be awarded Judgment therefore, together with 10% per 
annum interest from and after February 3, 1995 to date of Judgment, 
with the applicable Judgment rate thereon applying as of the date 
of the entry of the post-appeal Judgment and to continue in force 
and effect until paid or fully satisfied. 
Attorneys for plaintiffs shall prepare new Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on Post-Appeal Matters and a new Post-Appeal 
Judgment in conformance with the April 1, 1996 bench decision, as 
modified hereby. The post-appeal Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment shall then be submitted to counsel for defendants to sign 
"approved as to form." Thereafter, they shall be submitted to 
Judge Henriod for signature and entry. 
12 |4-Dated this -*> / day of December, 1996. 
K^ NNE^ FH RIGTRUl/ 
DISTRICT COURT JU&GE 
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foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this / / day of 
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Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq. 
201 S. Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
Attorney for Defendants 
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w matter due to the adjudication of multiple claims arising under several contracts with each party winning some and losing some. This Court heartly 
agrees. In Footnote 12 on the same page the appeals 
court directed on remand Richards must set out the 
time and fees expended for successful claims which 
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, 
unsuccessful clairs for which there would have been 
an entitlement to anorney fees had the claims been 
successful and cla^rts for which there is no 
entitlement to the attorney fees. 
The trial court's findings should then 
mirror the foregoing categories so they may be 
reviewable. •'-
The recalculation of Defendant's 
16 outstanding balance and interest due on the Interwest 
Purchase Agreement is based on the accountings 
contained in Exhibits P-6 and P-l 1, making the 
S500,000 adjustment and arriving at the new balance 
due involves the process of mathematical calculation 
which the Court assumes can be accomplished between 
22 the parties. 
23 The total time expended by the attorneys 
24 for both sides was reasonably close and to some 

















1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is in the case of Boyd 
3 J. Brown versus David K. Richards, et aL; 
4 FileC87-1411. 
5 We've got oending the motion to Lift 
6 Judgment Lien ana Request for Hearing. Before we 
7 address that motion, let me share my decision with 
8 you. 
9 Messrs. Coke and Call before you are too 
10 hasty in your criticism, I'd Call upon you to reflect 
11 on the earlier award of fees which you had And I 
12 realize they weren't appealed but I've kept that in 
13 mind in the award of fees to Mr. Richards. And I 
14 think if it can be said that the task of the 
15 Defendants in pursing their fraud claims was large in 
16 comparison to all the other tasks, on the other si<3e 
17 of the com the task in defending the fraud claims 
18 was a rather large task on the part of Mr. Brown and 
19 occupied a good deal of your time. So I did try to 
20 keep some balance in terms of what I had done in the 
21 past, though I realize that fee went unchallenged 
22 On remand, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
23 directed the Court to recalculate Defendant's 
24 outstanding balance and interest owing on the 
25 Interwest Purchase Agreement at time of trial. 
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1 and services rendered by the attorneys in pursuing 
2 the case to conclusion. 
3 The hourly billing rates charged by 
4 counsel for Defendant while somewhat higher than 
5 those by billed by Plaintiffs attorneys, were 
6 nonetheless generally consistent with rates 
7 customarily charged in the community for similar 
8 services considering the complexities of the 
9 litigation involved and the experience and skills of 
10 Defendant's counsel. 
11 Mr. Campbell testified that counsel for
 # 
12 Defendant did no: allocate time based on individual 
13 claims, and they do not to this day because of the 
14 impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult, 
15 if not impossible in many instances, to know how 
16 efforts made ffligh: relate'to one claim or another. 
17 There was an overlapping of the warranty evidence and 
18 fraud evidence such mat "one could not allocate the 
19 time expended to one claim or to the other with any 
20 degree of precision The entries in the billing of 
21 Defendant's counsel are like those of counsel for 
22 Plaintiffs, quite general and vague. Over 200 hours 
23 were expended by counsel for Defendants in allocating 
24 time expended in this case. 
25 Out of $1,^50,000 found by the jury in 
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1 Also this Court has been directed to 
2 redetermine the amount of aEorney fees due Richards 
3 through trial. 
4 The Court of Apoeals reversed this Court 
5 for its failure to award 6rowa attorneys' fees for 
6 his successful efforts in enforcing his contractual 
7 rights unrelated to the sale of Interwest assets, 
8 wnich this Court needs to determine. 
9 The Court of Appeals has concluded that 
10 Richards was the prevailing party on appeal. 
11 Both parties were directed on remand to 
12 make their respective evidentiary showings of 
13 reasonable fees pertaining to the appeal as outlined 
14 in the Court's opinion. 
15 Finally, the judgment will reauire 
16 correction to reinstate the jurv's verdict that 
17 Richards was entitled to 5100,000 on his breach of 
18 warranty claim. 
19 Also, the issues of tax and related costs 
20 is before this Court. 
21 Richards, in the fee hearing before this 
22 Court, has asserted a claim for fees incurred in 
23 going forward with the fee hearing. 
24 The Court of Appeals observed that in 
25 this case the award of attorneys' fees is a complex 
Page 3 
1 favor of Richards, only 100,000 was found by the jury 
2 as damages relating to breach of warranties. In 
3 achieving that result, counsel for Defendants in 
4 pursuing the claims of the counterclaim dealt with 
5 the issues of fraud negligent misrepresentation 
6 breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, 
7 punitive damages and damages. In addition, they 
8 pursued a claim for rescission, which ultimately was 
9 dropped prior to trial. Also, a part performance 
claim was asserted by them when the case was 
submitted to the jury. 
In defending Plaintiffs complaint, they 
dealt with issues relating to the sale of assets as 
well as issues relating to the sale of the building, 
which generally were less difficult and more straight 
forward. They dealt with tax issues, rent issues, 
17 continuance problems, the extended problems relating 
18 to Defendant's damage claims, efforts in seeking 
19 mandamus, problems relating to the undertaking of 
20 security and other miscellaneous problems along the 
21 way. 
22 The theme of Richards1 case was fraud 
23 They carried that claim to the Jury by clear and 
24 convincing evidence. By far the greater quantity dfi 
25 evidence and the ereater number of witnesses ™ ^ 
Page6 
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supposed negligent misrepresentation and breach of 
fic.icrary dury. The result of expendi ture of ximc 
efforts and expenses are fairly mirrored in the 
Jury's verdict. 
Considering all of the foregoing, the 
G x r : concludes and finds that the allegation oc 
Defendant's counsel allocates more time to 
Defendant's claims of breach warranty than are 
reasonable and fair. The Court finds that a more 
reasonable allocation of time expended in 
successfully pursuing that claim would be generally 
35 percent oi the total time expended through r i a l 
or i lowable fees of S218,986.42 to Richards. 
The Defendants successfully defeated 
P layof f ' s claim to an increased purchase price of 
500.000 for the Interwest assets when Ricnarcs did 
noc exerci^ the option to purchase the Executive Air 
T e m n a l building, which was a significant appeal 
issue on which Defendants prevailed. In add] i o n , 
they successfully reinstated the $100,000 breach of 
war^n tv verdict on appeal. 
6rown and Interwest, on the other hand, 
successfully defended Richards' c la ims for rescission 
for which 6rown was entitled to an award of fees. 
Finally, Brown and Interwest prevailed in 
Page 7 
1 trial costs of SI , 190. 
2 Notwithstanding any prior rulings on 
3 interest, under James Qms t ruc t e r s Inc. v. Salt Lake 
4 City Corporation, prejudgment interest is not 
5 appropriate. However, the issues herein were finally 
6 suomitted to Court by Plaintiffs summary, however 
7 relief requested and filed with this court February 
8 3, 1995. 
9 The Court concludes that it would be -
10 it would be fair and reasonable to award interest on 
11 the amounts awarded herein at the rate of ten percent 
12 per annum from and after February 3, 1995. 
13 The Court is uncertain as to who will owe 
14 who when this is all factored into the judgment. 
15 Plaintiffs' counsel are requested to incorporate 
16 these rulings into the former judgment, p r ior 
17 interest rulings on the court and the rulings of the 
is Utah Court or Appeals and submit a finaTjudgment 
19 approved as to form by Defendants ' counsel. 
20 How long, Mr. Coke, do you need to do 
21 that task? 
22 MR. COKE: A week? Considering what I 
23 have on my plate already. 
24 THE COURT: I d id that because when the 
25 other side does the proposals you object to them 
Pace 10 
defeating the fees award by the trial court to 
Richards through trial. 
There were a number of other issues 
ra^ed on appeal which were considered but were not 
tre?.;ed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 
Considering the foregoing, the Court 
concludes and finds that the allocation of 
Defendants' counsel allocates more time to the claims 
Defendants prevailed on on appeal , and makes no 
allowance for the fact that Plaintiffs preveiled on 
any issues. The Court finds that a more reasonable 
allocation of time in successfully pursuing the 
appeal would be 60 percent of tne total time 
expended, or an allowable fee to Richards on aopeal 
ofSSO.987.28. 
Defendants seek an award of $134,751 for 
fees incurred in appellate review and in a pennon 
to Utah Supreme court for certiori, which was not 
accepted. No effort was made by counsel for 
Defendants to allocate those fees to any particular 
c l ams ; accordingly, those fees are disal lowed 
Additionally, Defendants seek attorneys' 
fees and costs post-anneal from November 1/1993, 
through February 1,1995, in the amount of 
S7S.lli9.32. Again, no allocation thereof has been 
Pase8 
1 I 'm not so sure that y o u can do any better, but I am 
2 going to give you a try. And I assume you ' l l confer 
3 with them as you go along and as you trip into 
4 problems and hopefully get it done and concluded 
5 MR. COKE: I can do that. 
6 MS. DUNNING: May I, Your Honor? 
7 When you talk with James Constructers and 
8 no prejudgment interest being proper, I assume that 's 
9 on the attorney fees? 
10 THE COURT: Yes, at torney fees and costs, 
n MS. DUNNING: Not on the 5100,000, which 
12 was -
13 THE COURT: No. I think that Si00,000 
14 should go clear back to the t ime of the Special 
15 Verdict. 
16 MS. DUNNING: That was your previous 
17 ruling, and I want wan ted to make sure that we didn' t 
18 have — 
19 THE COURT: I made a number of rulings. 
20 I didn' t sign an order because I got an objection. 
21 We never did have a hearing. And I still have those 
22 orders. The only ru l ings I intended to retreat on 
23 were the ones that were reflected in the James 
24 Construction decision that relates to fees. 
25 MS. DUNNING: Your Honor, in the interim 
P a a c l l 
made, and those fees and costs are disa l lowed 
There appears to be no dispute in Brown's 
claims for fees incurred in successfully resisting 
4 Richard's rescission claim; accordingly, Brown is 
5 awarded judgment against Richards for these fees in 
6 the amount of $7,879.50. 
7 The contract language in question 
s provides for the recovery to the Drevailing pany of 
9 its reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The Court 
10 construes "costs" in its usual and ordinary meaning. 
11 There appear to be no dispute - appears to be no 
12 dispute in Defendants' appellate costs. Defendants 
13 areawarded their costs incurred on appeal in the 
14 amount of SI,835.09. 
15 Defendants' filing fees of $235 are not 
16 contested and are recoverable. They are allowed and 
IT taxed 
is While the witness fees of S955 are not 
19 specifically attributed to particular witnesses, when 
20 divided by 35, little more than the statutory witness 
21 fee plus modest mileage results; accordingly, the 
22 full S955 is allowed and taxed. 
23 The Court concludes that other identified 
expenses and costs are not properly recoverable as 
coks; accordingly, the Defendants are awarded total 
Page9 Page 12 
1 while we are working on this order, which in the past 
2 has been a very lengthy process, will the Court lirt 
3 the judgment hen on Mr. Richards ' property so that 
4 - I don ' t think the difference, given where we are, 
5 is going to be so enormous that Mr. Brown is at any 
6 risk in the interim for being unsecured. 
7 THE COURT: I th ink you are going to be 
8 fairly close, is my guess , but - and I've kind of 
9 roughed it out in m y m i n d at least, and it seems to 
10 me that the end result is not going to be far apart 
11 MS. DUNNING: Right. So , in the 
12 meantime, Mr. Richards nas got a development project 
13 on some land in Salt Lake Coun ty which was the 
14 subject of the most recent request to lift the 
15 judgment lien. And he — 
16 THE COURT: Is another ten days going to 
17 cause a problem -
18 MS. DUNNING: Well -
19 THE COURT: - if we can get the final 
20 judgment done and entered? A n d then we know what it 
21 is. 
22 MS. DUNNING: The question is, is there 
23 any really likelihood that this wil l be done in tea ^
 r• *, .<. * 
24 days. And I think the answer is n o t Mr. C o k ^ i a l i ^ / 1 ^ 
25 he has some other pressing things he has to do 
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1 first. And our history was it took eight months to 
2 do the first judgment. I am just concerned that it 
3 is not - I think it's going to be weeks before we 
4 are back before you. If the Court -
5 THE COURT: How much have we got in 
6 Summit County9 
7 MS. DUNNING. I think it is about 1,900 
8 acres. 
9 THE COURT. Mr. Coke, do you want to 
10 respond? 
n MR. COKE The reason I asked the Court 
12 to rule is so that I could then discern what it is. 
13 If it is discerned by me from your order and looking 
14 at my files, the amount is, as suggested, small. 
15 Then, of course, I don't have any problems. On the 
16 other hand, I don't know anything about the Summit 
n County property other than it Summit County 
18 property. And it may be worth a lot of a money. It 
19 may not be worth anything. It is not nearly as nice 
20 as having interest in the proceeds from a sale which 
21 I waived And I not trying to be an obstructionist 
22 here. I am trying to be sensible. Because I am the 
23 one that that W t o waive it My client is away. 
24 THE COURT: I think I ought to decide the 
25 issue by the end of the week. And I ought to give 
Page 14 
1 you a chance at least to take what you've got and 
2 rough it out in your mind and review it and see if 
3 you can ascertain what the difference is. I think it 
4 is fairly close. And if it is, then we ought to free 
5 up everything other than is essential to secure what 
6 there is left. 
7 MR. CAMPBELL Your Honor, can't the 
8 Court simply order us to just submit an order or a 
9 judgment incorporating the Court's rulings in ten 
10 days? I mean, these are - these are now arithmetic 
11 numbers -
12 THE COURT: I think they are. 
13 MR CAMPBELL. - I think that no one can 
14 dispute. They may not like it one way or the other, 
15 but the judgment is subject right now to very finite, 
16 precise calculation, and we ought to be able to get 
17 that back to the Court in ten days. If we don't do 
lis that and the Court doesn't order it, will be weeks 
19 before we do it. 
20 THE COURT: well, Mr. Coke says a week, 
21 and so I assume we can have it done in a week and 
22 submit it for approval and know where we are. I 
23 would invite, although I have been in trial for about 
24 five weeks and we'lf start another one Wednesday, I 'm 
25 available early in the morning or late at night or 
Page 15 
I l the noon hour or whatever, I would invite conference 
2 calls to get off center and get it done. So -
3 MR CAMPBELL Would the Court --
4 THE COURT: - today is the --1 think we 
5 ought to have the final judgment submitted by the 
6 10th of April, and then I'llrule on the extent of 
7 the security left and complete it. 
8 MR CAMPBELL In the arriving of the 
9 amount and the calculation of attorneys fees, Your 
10 Honor, the Court indicated some general numbers of 35 
II percent and 60 percent, respectively, for attorney 
12 fees at trial and on appeal, out did the Court make a 
13 calculation or follow-up methodology in arriving at 
14 the amount that is set forth of the 200 and - for 
15 example, the - the amount of S218,000 the Court 
16 awarded for Richards in the allocation, was that 
17 based on 35 percent of the total amount that Richards 
18 submitted to the Court, or is that based on an hourly 
19 calculation of the number of hours that were spent 
20 and the calculation of those hours? 
21 THE COURT: First I surveyed and reviewed 
22 the evidence that was first presented on the total 
23 hours by both attorneYS on both sides. I went back 
24 and reviewed what I nad awarded Mr. Brown for his 
125 efforts. And then I went back and reviewed the time J 
~J P a s 16 i 
1 expended at trial, all the claims and the general 
2 tasks that were involved And based upon that, I 
3 took 35 percent of your claimed time and hours 
4 through trial and awarded that amount. 
5 Then on the appeal time, I went back and 
6 surveyed as best I could keeping in mind that the 
7 Court of Appeals said there were a number of issues 
g that were asserted but weren't - and were considered 
9 but not treated in their decision. I did not have 
10 those briefs. But, overall, I reviewed the claims 
11 that they treated specifically and how that compared 
12 with what was tried and awarded 60 percent of those 
13 hours in the time expended in the appellate process, 
14 and then disallowed everything post-appeal. 
15 MR.COKE: ThankvouTVour Honor. 
16 MR. CAMPBELL: Tfjank you, Your Honor. 
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DAVID K. RICHARDS & 
COMPANY and DAVID K. 
RICHARDS, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counter Plaintiffs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON POST APPEAL MATTERS 
(POST RECONSIDERATION) 
Civil No. C87-01411 
Judge: Stephen L. Henroid 
Subsequent to the appeal in this case, the court has heard evidence and argument 
regarding a number of issues, including defendants' ("Richards") trial, appeal and post-appeal 
attorney fees, a limited portion of plaintiffs' ("Brown") attorneys fees, pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest and recoverable costs. 
Pursuant to motion, the court on August 29, 1994 heard argument on Brown's motion 
for partial summary judgment issues of interest and post-appeal fees. The court ruled that 
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compound interest was improper; that Richards was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the 
breach of warranty damages from April 24, 1984, at the contract rate of 10%; and that Richards 
was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the yet-to-be-determined attorneys fees. The court 
reserved a decision on the issue of Richards' post-appeal fees. 
The court permitted the plaintiff to elicit testimony from defendants' attorneys via sworn 
courtroom testimony of Elizabeth T. Dunning on April 12, 1994, which testimony continued via 
deposition on April 20, 1994. The court also granted Brown's motion to hold a full evidentiary 
hearing on attorney fees, which hearing was from January 31, 1995 through February 3, 1995. 
During that hearing Brown and Richards both called witnesses in support of their respective 
positions on attorneys fees. The transcripts of Ms. Dunning's testimony were also submitted. 
The Court announced its decision on April 1, 1996. 
On June 17, 1996 the Court heard argument on Richard's motion to reconsider and took 
the matter under advisement. The court has also heard argument of the issue of interest and has 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the attorneys fees and interest issues. 
After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court now makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The total time expended by the attorneys for both parties was reasonably close and 
to some extent validates the overall reasonableness of time and services rendered by the 
attorneys in pursuing the case to conclusion. However, the Brown fees were not appealed, while 
the Richards' fees were, thus subjecting the Richards' fees to review consistent with the remand 
instructions of the Utah Court of Appeals. Even though the proofs presented at the remand 
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hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the remand instructions, the Court nonetheless 
made a significant effort to consider the factors outlined by the court of appeals in arriving at 
reasonable fees to be awarded to Richards. 
2. The hourly billing rates charged by counsel for defendants, while somewhat higher 
than those billed by plaintiffs' attorneys, were nonetheless generally consistent with rates 
customarily charged in the community for similar services considering the complexities of the 
litigation involved and the experience and skills of defendants' counsel. 
3. Defendants' counsel did not allocate time based on individual claims because of 
the impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult if not impossible in many instances to know 
how efforts made might relate to one claim or another. There was an overlapping of the 
warranty evidence and fraud evidence such that one could not allocate the time expended to one 
claim or the other with any degree of precision. The entries in the billing of defendants' counsel 
are like those of counsel for plaintiffs, quite general and vague. 
4. Over 200 hours were expended by counsel for defendants following the appeal in 
attempting to allocate time expended in this case. 
5. Of the $1,450,000.00 found by the jury in favor of Richards, $100,000 was found 
by the jury as damages resulting to breach of warranties. In achieving that result, counsel for 
defendants, in pursuing the claims of the counterclaim, dealt with the issues of fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages and damages. 
In addition, defendants pursued a claim for rescission which ultimately was dropped prior to 
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trial. Also, a part performance claim was asserted by them when the case was submitted to the 
jury. 
6. In defending plaintiffs' complaint, defendants' counsel dealt with issues relating 
to the sale of assets as well as issues relating to the sale of the building which were generally 
less difficult and more straight forward. Defendants' counsel dealt with tax issues, rent issues, 
continuance problems and the extended problems relating to defendants' damage claims, efforts 
in seeking mandamus, problems relating to the undertaking of security and other miscellaneous 
problems along the way. 
7. The theme of Richards' case was fraud. Defendants' counsel carried that claim 
to the jury by clear and convincing evidence by far the greater quantity of evidence and the 
greater number of witnesses supported negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. 
The result of expenditure of time, efforts and expenses are clearly mirrored in the jury's verdict. 
8. On appeal the defendants successfully defeated plaintiffs' claims to an increased 
purchase price of $500,000 for the Interwest assets when Richards did not exercise the option 
to purchase the executive air terminal building, which was a significant appeal issue. In 
addition, defendants successfully reinstated the $100,000 breach of warranty verdict on appeal. 
9. Brown and Interwest on the other hand successfully defended Richards' claim for 
rescission for which Brown was entitled to an award of fees. 
10. Brown and Interwest prevailed in gaining a remand on the issue of the fees 
awarded by the trial court to Richards through trial. 
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11. There were a number of other issues raised on appeal which were considered but 
were not treated by the court of appeals in its decision. 
12. The Court has reconsidered Richards' claim for post-appeal fees in light of the 
Utah Supreme Court's opinion allowing fees incurred in seeking fees in Salmon v. Davis Co., 
916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). 
13. The substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys post-appeal, except for time 
expended on post-judgment lien and security issues, on the form and content of supplemental 
Findings, Conclusions and Post-Appeal Judgments (which include other issues involving 
accounting, interest computations, etc.), have been directed to attorney fees, costs and relevant 
interest issues. 
14. Counsel for Richards' counml used "block-billing" in this case. The testimony 
of George T. Naegle and David B. Thompson on time recording and billing practices, i.e. 
recording time and billing therefore for the specific tasks was very credible. As Mr. Naegle 
testified, the insurance industry has required particularized billings since the late 1980's. 
Moreover, their testimony is consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in this case and the earlier pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
15. Because time was not entered and accounted for by specific tasks, the internal 
accounting system could not mechanically allocate time. As a result, many needless post-appeal 
hours were spent allocating time, which could have been much more efficiently handled as an 
accounting function. 
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16. Moreover, many hours and expense have been incurred in the fee debate. 
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and having considered its 
previous rulings, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that the allocation of fees by defendants' counsel allocates 
more time to defendants' claims of breach of warranty than is reasonable and fair. The court 
concludes that a more reasonable allocation of time expended in successfully pursuing that claim 
would be generally 35% of the total time expended through trial. Based upon the total fees 
generated through trial, this results in a presently allowable fee to Richards of $218,986.42. 
2. The court concludes that the allocation of fees by defendants' counsel allocates 
more time to defendants' successful claims on appeal and makes no allowance for the fact that 
plaintiffs prevailed on many issues. The defendants' request of $134,751.00 for fees incurred 
on appeal and for ^unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court does not 
allocate those fees to any particular claims. The court finds that a more reasonable allocation 
of time in successfully pursuing the appeal would be 60% of the total fees expended by 
defendants' counsel, or $80,987.28 awarded to Richards for appeals fees. 
3. Defendants seek attorneys fees and costs incurred on post-appeal matters from 
November 1, 1993 through February 1, 1995 in the amount of $78,169.32. This amount is 
excessive and unreasonable. The Court finds that 60% of that amount, or $46,901.59, is 
reasonable, with interest of 10% per annum from and after July 1, 1995 to the date of the post-
appeal Judgment. 
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4. As found by the court of appeals, plaintiffs' counsel is entitled to fees incurred 
in successfully resisting defendants' rescission claim. The Court finds the hourly rates charged 
by Brown's counsel were appropriate and well within the rates customarily charged in the 
community for such services, and therefore plaintiffs are entitled to fees against defendants in 
the principal amount of $7,879.50, with 10% interest per annum thereon from February 3, 1995 
until the date of the post-appeal judgment. Thereafter judgment interest shall accrue at the rate 
of 7.45% per annum on the principal amount. 
5. The language of the contract in question provides for recovery to the prevailing 
party of its reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The broader term "expenses" was not used in 
the contract. The court construes costs in its usual and ordinary meaning. 
6. There appears to be no dispute in defendants' appellate costs and defendants are 
therefore entitled to recover appeal costs of $1,835.09. 
7. Defendants are entitled to recoverable trial costs of $235.00 for filing fees and 
$955.00 for witness fees, for a total of $1,190.00. 
8. The court concludes that other identifiable expenses incurred by defendants are 
not properly recoverable as costs. 
9. The Court, under James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 888 
P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) (decided after this court's August 29, 1994 ruling), concludes that 
pre-judgment interest on attorney fees is appropriate. Although the Utah Court of Appeals' 
opinion in this case indicated Richards' fee award was "vacated," it is clear that the case was 
remanded "for a redetermination of the amount of fees." 840 P.2d at 157. Accordingly, the 
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rationale of Mason v. Western Mortgage, ISA P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988) is applicable. 
Therefore, the court concludes that it would be fair and reasonable to award pre-judgment 
interest on the attorney fees awarded by this court at the rate of 12% per annum on the trial fees 
of $218,986.42 from and after October 18, 1990. 
10. The Court concludes that all judgment rates of interest for new amounts awarded 
in the post-appeal judgement are fees and costs awarded pursuant to the contracts between the 
parties. These awards must therefore bear interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum. 
DATED this M day of //VUU^{ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved As To Form: 
c:\wpwin\jwcpld\brn-reco. ff 
^7<n<t3a^^ 
STEPHEN L. HENROID, DISTRICT JUDGE 
AyOPTo^vA^ 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ADDENDUM D 
BRUCE E. COKE, ESQ., Bar No. 0694 
JOHN W. CALL, ESQ., Bar No. 0542 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counter Defendants 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, 
and INTERWEST AVIATION 




DAVE) K. RICHARDS & 
COMPANY and DAVID K. 
RICHARDS, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counter Plaintiffs. 
The trial by jury in the above cause began February 28, 1989 and concluded with the 
jury's verdict on April 22, 1989. The jury returned a special verdict which was incorporated 
in the Final Judgment entered by the court on October 18, 1990. Thereafter the parties appealed 
and an opinion was rendered in Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
Pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals, the October 18, 1990 judgment 
is to be modified to reduce the $900,000.00 purchase price, by the $500,000.00 awarded to 
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POST-APPEAL JUDGMENT 
(POST RECONSD3ERATION) 
Civil No. C87-01411 
Judge: Stephen L. Henroid 
defendants ("Richards") for fraud, to $400,000.00 and to vacate the judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs ("Brown") for a $500,000.00 increase in purchase price. The jury's verdict awarding 
$100,000.00 to Richards on his breach of warranty counterclaim is to be reinstated. The other 
awards on Brown's claims and Richards' claims were affirmed, except the attorney fee award 
to Richards was vacated by the court of appeals and the matter remanded for a redetermination 
of the amount of fees due Brown. 
This Court was directed to determine the amount of fees Brown was entitled to in 
enforcing his contractual rights unrelated to the asset sale. Accordingly, this Court took 
evidence from the parties and their attorneys, culminating in an evidentiary hearing held from 
January 30, 1995 through February 3, 1995. The Court announced its decision on April 1, 
1996. On June 17, 1996 the Court heard argument on Richards' motion to reconsider and took 
the matter under advisement. The court has also heard argument of the issue of interest and has 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the attorneys fees and interest issues. 
Now, therefore, being duly advised in the premises, it is therefore: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ON AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
1. On plaintiffs' first cause of action, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Boyd 
J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually, and David K. Richards & Company in 
the amount of $200,000.00 ($450,000.00 contract price, less $250,000.00, one-half of the 
$500,000.00 reduction ordered by the Utah Court of Appeals), subject to the following interest, 
credits and adjustments: 
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Accrued Contract Interest: $ 23,506.20 
Less Total Payments: $ 164,925.00 
Principal Balance due on 4-1-86: $ 58,581.20 
Interest has accrued from April 1, 1986 on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per annum, 
pursuant to the contract. Through February 1, 1997 the accrued interest is $63,461.01. Brown 
is therefore awarded judgment in the amount of $122,042.21, principal and interest through 
February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue from that date at the contract interest rate 
of 10% per annum on the $58,581.20 principal balance. 
2. On the plaintiffs' second cause of action, judgment is entered in favor of Boyd 
J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the 
amount of $200,000.00 ($450,000.00 contract price, less $250,000.00, one-half of the 
$500,000.00 reduction ordered by the Utah Court of Appeals), subject to the following interest, 
credits and adjustments: 
Accrued Contract Interest: $ 22,542.00 
Less Total Payments: $ 53,693.90 
Balance due on 4-1-86 $168,848.10 
Interest on unpaid balance on 12/89 $ 11,301.64 
Principal Judgment as of 12/20/89 $181,149.74 
The principal balance due has accrued interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum in the 
amount of $182,913.19, as of February 1, 1997, together with additional interest on the interest 
portion of the judgment balance from December 20, 1989 to February 1, 1997 of $8,046.76. 
Brown is therefore awarded judgment in the amount of $372,109.69 as of February 1, 1997. 
Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest rate of 10% per annum on the balance. 
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3. On plaintiffs' sixth cause of action regarding the increased purchase price, 
pursuant to the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals the judgment previously awarded Brown 
is hereby vacated. 
4. On plaintiffs' third cause of action, the jury found that David K. Richards 
individually and David K. Richards & Company owed, at the time of trial, the amount of 
$407,259.00 on the agreement to purchase the Interwest building. There remained at that time 
$490,000.00 in principal which was not yet due, but which has now become due. The court 
awarded Brown judgment for $529,996.10, which included $248,371.00 principal payments then 
due. The last payment made by Richards, as indicated in exhibit D-269, included a $31,629.00 
payment principal, leaving the principal due and owing, as of April 2, 1986, of $668,371.00. 
All payments of principal and interest thereon have now become due and plaintiff Boyd J. Brown 
is therefore awarded judgment in that amount against David K. Richards individually and David 
K. Richards & Company. Pursuant to the contract, interest accrues at the rate of 10% per 
annum. Interest due thereon as of February 1, 1997 is $724,046.30, for a total judgment of 
$1,392,417.30 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest 
rate of 10% per annum on the $668,371.00 principal balance. 
5. On plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, the court previously granted a motion for 
directed verdict and this cause of action was dismissed with prejudice in the October 18, 1990 
judgment. 
6. On plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, for rent on the Executive Building, the court 
granted judgment in favor of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and 
David K. Richards & Company in the principal amount of $230,141.00 together with interest 
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then owing of $16,645.81. Since that time additional contract interest has accrued on the 
principal through February 1, 1997 in the amount of $144,643.62, for a total judgment of 
$391,430.43 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue on the principal balance 
of $230,141.00 at the contract rate. 
7. In addition to rent on the Executive Building, judgment was entered in the October 
18, 1990 judgment in favor of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and 
David K. Richards & Company for the rent on the Interwest Building in the principal amount 
of $6,250.00, plus interest accruing through December 20, 1989 in the amount of $3,006.85. 
Since December 20, 1989 the accrued interest at the contract rate is $4,445.01, for a total 
judgment of $13,701.86 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue on the 
principal amount from that date at the contract rate. 
8. The October 18, 1990 judgment was entered in favor of Boyd J. Brown and 
against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the principal 
amount of $250,000.00 for Brown's attorney fees. Since that time interest has accrued at the 
contract rate of 10% per annum in the amount of $157,125.00, for a total judgment of 
$407,125.00 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue at the contract 
rate of 10% per annum on the principal amount. 
9. In addition to the trial fees awarded to Brown, judgment is hereby entered in favor 
of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & 
Company for additional attorney fees, as directed by the Utah Court of Appeals, in the principal 
amount of $7,879.50, together with 10% pre-judgment interest from February 5, 1995 to the 
date of entry herein ($1,569.52 as of February 1, 1997), for a total judgment of $9,449.02 as 
5 oomi\ ,,,,. -.., 
of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum shall accrue on 
the principal balance from the date of entry herein. 
II 
ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF DAVID K. RICHARDS & 
COMPANY AND DAVID K. RICHARDS INDIVIDUALLY. 
1. As to the First Claim for Relief for fraudulent misrepresentation, this Court 
entered judgment against Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation in the amount of 
$500,000.00 together with interest from April 22, 1984 in its October 18, 1990 judgment. 
Pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals this award of $500,000.00 was applied 
as a reduction of the amounts owed on the first and second half of the Asset Sale Agreement. 
Accordingly, the judgment of this Court for $500,000.00 on the first Claim for Relief is hereby 
satisfied. 
2. With regard to the remaining part of defendants' First Claim for Relief as to 
punitive damages, the court entered judgment on October 18, 1990 in favor of David K. 
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown in the principal 
amount of $550,000.00, together with interest through December 20, 1989, in the amount of 
$36,465.75. Since December 20, 1989 additional statutory judgment interest at the rate of 12% 
has accrued in the amount of $470,250.00, for a total judgment of $1,056,715.75 as of February 
1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue on the principal amount at the rate of 12% 
per annum. 
3. As to the defendants' Second Claim for Relief for negligent misrepresentation, 
although the jury determined that negligent misrepresentations were made, this Court determined 
that the measure of compensatory damages was identical to the damages awarded defendants 
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under the First Claim for Relief and subsumed thereby. Therefore, judgment is entered in favor 
of David K. Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown 
and Interwest Aviation in the amount of $0.00. 
4. As to defendants' Third Claim for Relief of breach of warranty, the jury 
determined that Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corp. breached warranties to David K. 
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually in the sale of the Interwest business 
assets and found as damages thereof the amount of $100,000.00 pursuant to the directive of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, judgment is entered in favor of David K. Richards & Company and 
David K. Richards individually and against Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corp. in the 
amount of $100,000.00, together with contract interest at 10% from April 24, 1984 through 
February 1, 1997, in the present amount of $127,672.40 for a total judgment of $227,672.40 
as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest rate of 10% per 
annum on the $100,000.00 principal balance. 
5. As to defendants' Fourth Claim for Relief for breach of fiduciary duty, judgment 
was entered on the jury verdict in the principal amount of $300,000.00 in favor of David K. 
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown in the final 
judgment of October 18, 1990, together with interest through December 20, 1989 in the amount 
of $19,890.41. Additional statutory judgment interest at 12% per annum has accrued from that 
day through February 1, 1997 in the amount of $255,360.00. Total judgment therefore is 
$575,250.41 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue on the principal 
amount at the rate of 12% per annum. 
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6. Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion, the prior judgment for fees 
awarded to Richards is vacated. Therefore, pursuant to this court's post-appeal findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, judgment is entered in favor of David K. Richards, individually, and 
David K. Richards & Company against Boyd J. Brown in the principal amounts of $218,986.42 
for trial attorney fees, $80,987.28 for appellate fees and $46,901.59 for post-appeal fees, for 
a total attorney fee award of $346,875.29. Accrued contract judgment interest at 10% per 
annum is awarded on the trial fees from October 18, 1990 ($137,632.96 as of February 1, 
1997). Pre-judgment interest of 10% per annum is awarded from February 3, 1995 on the 
appeal fees and post-appeal fees to the date of entry herein ($25,250.15 as of February 1, 1997), 
for a total judgment of $509,758.40 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue 
to accrue at the contract rate of 10% on the trial fee principal. Judgment interest on the 
principal appellate and post-appeal fees shall accrue at the contract rate from the date of entry 
herein. 
7. Based upon the court's post-appeal findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
defendants are awarded judgment against plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $235.00 filing fees, 
$955.00 witness fees, and $1,835.09 appellate costs, together with pre-judgment interest of 10% 
per annum from February 3, 1995 to February 1, 1997 of $605.02 for a total judgment in the 
amount of $3,630.11 as of February 1, 1997. Interest will accrue on the costs from the date of 
entry herein at the contract rate of 10% per annum. 
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Ill 
OFFSET AND STAY 
1. The amounts awarded as judgment to the plaintiffs and defendants shall constitute 
an offset and the plaintiff Boyd J. Brown is awarded a net judgment against the defendants David 
K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the amount of $335,248.38 as 
of February 1, 1997. Any calculation of the net judgment on the date of entry herein or any 
date thereafter shall be made by calculating the principal and interest due under each judgment 
amount awarded herein, as of the date of calculation. 
2. All prior orders entered by the court staying execution of judgment are hereby 
vacated with the entry of this judgment. 
DATED this ?>( day of /MfaCiA , 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
STEPHEN L. HENROID 
y 
Approved As To Form: 
v\>0\C^ 
Attorneys for Defendants 
c: \wpwin\j wcpld\bm-rec2 .jud 
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ADDENDUM E 
ADDENDUM 
SUMMARY OP DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING THE TRANSACTION 
BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES 
Exhibit No, 

































Between May and 
June 1985 
Exhibit PI Richards1 Letter Agreement 
Exhibit P2 Exchange Agreement 
Exhibit P4 Stock Purchase and Option 
Agreement 
Exhibit P5 Option Agreement (First) 
Exhibit P6 Asset Sale and Purchase 
and Option Agreement 
Exhibit P7 Option Agreement (Second) 
Exhibit P8 Supplemental Agreement 
Exhibit P9 Richards1 Letter 
Exhibit P10 Agreement to Amend Pre-
vious Interwest Agreements 
Exhibit Pll Exercise of Option and 
Modification of Agreement 
Exhibit P12 Promissory Note 
Exhibit P16 Purchase Agreement 
Exhibit P99 Promissory Note ($721,000) 
(ATTACHED AS ADDENDUM "A11 TO BROWN'S BRIEF IN THE FIRST APPEAL) 
ADDENDUM F 
WATKISS &> CAMPBELL 
PAGE £ gf. S STATEMENT CONTINUATION 




















Research and prepare response to plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment? telephone conferenc 
with B. Coke, Esq. regarding rescheduling 
hearing on motion; conference with W. Simpson 
and B. Weed, CPA's, regarding examination 
of documents relative to McMahan airplane 
deals? Research and prepare responses to 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
Travel to Ogden for conference with J. Wightman, 
CPA, regarding McMahan airplane deals with 
B. Brown? sign and transmit stipulation to 
opposing counsel? telephone conference with 
D. K. Richards and research and prepare 
reply memorandum. 
Telephone conference with D. Hunger, D.K. 
1 Richards and J. Sharp confirming deposition 
schedule, etc.? research and prepare response 
to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
W. Ruiz - Delivery to 3rd District Court. 
Conference with D. K. Richards regarding 
preparation for J. Sharp deposition? interview 
J. Sharp and take deposition? follow-up telephon 
conference with client to report deposition 
results. 
Conference with Franklin N. Smith, Jr. regarding 
results of J. Sharp deposition and case status. 
Telephone conference with D. K. Richards 
and conference with Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
regarding outcome of J. Sharp deposition, 
etc.? research and prepare reply to plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment? conference with 
L. Kirkham, Esq. regarding further document 
production, etc.. 
Research and prepare response to plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment? conference with 
D. K. Richards, G. Black and W. Martineau 
regarding preparations for document inspection, 
etc.? review documents? transmittal letter 
to client. 
Research and prepare response to plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment? telephone 
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ADDENDUM G 
PACE 
WATKISS 4. CAMPBELL 
STATEMENT CONTINUATION 

























Prepare for argument before Judge Rigtrup; 
hearing. 
Conference with Robert S. Campbell, Jr.; 
review statement on judgment interest; 
conference with Leslie J. Randolph on 
research. 
Office conference with D. Richards; office 
conference with Franklin N. Smith, Jr.; 
review deposition summaries. 
Campbell project. 
Proofread Richards summary; organize 
deposition summary books, Martinueau 
deposition summary; copy deposition summaries 
for Elizabeth T. Dunning. 
Copied case and assembled binder. 
Research and prepare for argument of motions 
in limine and to compel; conference with 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. regarding preparation 
for hearing; telephone conference with client 
regarding results of hearing; conference with 
Elizabeth T. Dunning regarding transfer of 
case. 
Office conference with Franklin N. Smith, 
Jr.; office conference with Robert S. 
Campbell, Jr.. 
Martineau deposition summary; proofread 
Richards summary; organize deposition summary 
books. 
Conference with client; review case with 
Franklin N. Smith, Jr. and Elizabeth T. 
Dunning. 
Office conference with Franklin N. Smith, 
Jr., Robert S. Campbell, Jr. regarding status 
of c$se. 
Martineau Vol. I deposition summary; 
proofread Richards Vol. 5 summary; Martineau 
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ADDENDUM H 
PAGE 
WATK1SS &. CAMPBELL 
STATEMENT CONTINUATION 





















Review of damage research; office conference 
with Elizabeth T. Dunning; preparation for 
meeting with accountants. 
Review case with Foote; analysis of damage 
claims. 
Office conference with Robert S. Campbell/ 
Jr., Foote; Carolyn Cox regarding damages. 
Meeting with Elizabeth T. Dunning, Robert S. 
Campbell, Jr. and. Foote; office conference 
with Elizabeth T. Dunning; review of 
documents list. 
Telephone conference with client; review 
case; meeting with Foote and T. Dunning; 
Review fraud allegations. 
Telephone conference with client; hearing 
before Judge Rigtrup; meeting with Foote. 
Review Brown deposition; hearing on motion 
for extension of discovery; office conference 
with Foote; telephone conference with Smith 
regarding witnesses; review Sharp deposition; 
draft memorandum regarding witnesses; office 
conference with Carolyn Cox; office 
conference with Robert S. Campbell, Jr.; 
telephone conference with D. Richards. 
Office conference with Elizabeth T. Dunning 
regarding documents; review of document 
list. 
Telephone conference with D. Richards 
regarding witnesses; answer to 
interrogatories; telephone conference with 
Judge Rigtrup regarding motion to amend; 
review and revise memorandum regarding 
witnesses concerning Hobbs Meter; office 
conference with Carolyn Cox regarding 
documents. 
Visit to Interwest office; review of 
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